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ABSTRACT 
 
A Duration Analysis of Food Safety Recall Events in the United States:  
January, 2000 to October, 2009. (December 2010) 
Nathaniel Allen Joy, B.S. Economics, Texas A&M University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Victoria Salin  
 
The safety of the food supply in the United States has become an issue of 
prominence in the minds of ordinary Americans.  Several government agencies, 
including the United States Department of Agriculture and the Food and Drug 
Administration, are charged with the responsibility of preserving the safety of the food 
supply.  Food is withdrawn from the market in a product recall when tainted or 
mislabeled and has the potential to harm the consumer in some manner.  This research 
examines recall events issued by firms over the period of January, 2000 through 
October, 2009 in the United States. Utilizing economic and management theory to 
establish predictions, this study employs the Cox proportional hazard regression model 
to analyze the effects of firm size and branding on the risk of recall recurrence. The size 
of the firm was measured in both billions of dollars of sales and in thousands of 
employees.  Branding by the firm was measured as a binary variable that expressed if a 
firm had a brand and as a count of the number of brands within a firm. This study also 
provides a descriptive statistical analysis and several findings based on the recall data 
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specifically relating to annual occurrences, geographical locations of the firms involved, 
types of products recalled, and reasons for recall. We hypothesized that the increasing 
firm size would be associated with increased relative risk of a recall event while 
branding and an increasing portfolio of brands would be associated with decreased 
relative risk of a recall event.   However, it was found that increased firm size and 
branding by the firm are associated with an increased risk of recall occurrence.  The 
results of this research can have implications on food safety standards in both the 
public and private sectors. 
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NOMENCLATURE 
 
 
BYN  Binary Brand Variable indicating if a firn has a brand or not. 
Diff_Date Variable indicating the number of days between recall events. 
MRE Variable indicating the most recent number of employees observation of 
a firm in thousands of employees. 
MRE2  Squared term of the Most Recent Employees variable. 
MRS Variable indicating the most recent sales observation of a firm in millions 
of dollars. 
MRS2  Squared term of the Most Recent Sales variable. 
NBS  Variable indicating the number of brands owned by a firm. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
According to the acting United States Surgeon General, Rear Admiral Steven K. 
Galson (2009), “Americans still enjoy one of the safest food supplies in the world.”  This 
is despite apprehension with the nation’s food supply and the fact that many 
Americans are left wondering what is safe to eat. 
Due to several highly publicized food recall events, it is perceived that the 
general public has become less confident in the overall safety of the food supply.  In the 
end, food scares across the country are becoming more publicized and as a result are 
triggering public concern for the overall safety of the food supply (Institute of Food 
Technologists/Food and Drug Administration 2009). 
In recent years, food safety concerns have also intensified as a direct result of 
the September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks.  The potential susceptibility of food to 
deliberate contamination led President George W. Bush, in January 2004, to identify 
the United States food system as vulnerable to intentional acts of terrorism (Bush 
2004).  These concerns have raised pressure on those federal agencies in charge of the 
protection of the food supply in the United States. 
 
____________ 
This thesis follows the style of American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 
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The safety of the food supply is of critical importance to all parties involved.  In 
2009, President Barack Obama (2009) expressed the feelings of many American 
parents,  
“In the end, food safety is something I take seriously, not just as your President, 
but as a parent. When I heard peanut products were being contaminated earlier 
this year, I immediately thought of my 7-year old daughter, Sasha, who has 
peanut butter sandwiches for lunch probably three times a week. No parent 
should have to worry that their child is going to get sick from their lunch.” 
Such feelings have intensified the sentiment that firms that produce contaminated 
products must strengthen prevention efforts for the welfare of the public. 
It is generally perceived that a food recall event is an adverse occurrence for a 
firm that could lead to publicity problems, financial harm, and potential failure of the 
firm.  Recall events are primarily voluntary practices that are the result of a risk 
assessment by the firm.  A firm manager must decide whether to bring a product off of 
the shelf and experience direct financial loss or to jeopardize the consumer with the 
possibility of indirect financial damage. 
The primary questions to be addressed with this study are: 
(1) What factors influence the risk of recurrence of recall events for firms that 
have previously experienced at least one recall? 
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(2) How do these factors influence the risk of recurrence?  Do they increase or 
decrease the relative risk of a subsequent recall event? 
In this research, we will focus on firms that experience multiple recall events 
and will employ statistical methods to ascertain the risk of recurrence of these events.  
We will utilize economic and management theory to defend our presumptions and 
expectations.  We will also present several interesting findings that we feel are valuable 
contributions to the current understanding of food safety. 
We will present literature central to the food safety discussion. We will discuss 
the data used in this research.  We will then discuss the statistical model that we will 
employ and our hypotheses.  Finally, we will present our findings and conclusions. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
We will begin by presenting information and past findings that we feel are 
important contributions to the discussion of food safety and the management 
processes involved with recall events.  The Literature Review section is separated into 
four subsections: Regulatory Issues; Health Issues and Cost of Illnesses Due to 
Pathogens; Management Issues; and Recall Studies from Other Industries.  The 
Regulatory Issues subsection looks at the food safety regulatory structure with a 
primary emphasis on the United States. The Health Issues and Cost of Illnesses Due to 
Pathogens subsection considers problems that have resulted in food safety events and 
the costs related to them.  The Management Issues subsection discusses topics related 
to product traceability and decision making within the firm.  Finally, the Recall Studies 
from Other Industries subsection considers recall events in other industries that have 
potential relevance to practices in the food sector. 
2.1 Regulatory Issues 
Two primary federal agencies, the United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), are charged with the task of 
overseeing and maintaining the food supply of the United States.  The USDA has the 
authority to detain, seize, condemn, and destroy unsafe beef, poultry, and egg products 
under the Federal Meat Inspection Act, the Poultry Products Inspection Act, and the 
Egg Products Inspection Act.  These conditions may be from food that is believed to be 
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adulterated, mislabeled, or contaminated in some manner.  The USDA may force a 
production facility to shut down by either withdrawing meat or poultry inspectors or by 
removing the USDA “inspected and passed” label, both of which are mandatory (United 
States Government Accountability Office 2004b).  It is estimated that the USDA is 
responsible for regulation of about 20 percent of the food supply (United States 
Government Accountability Office 2007a).   
The FDA has the authority to seize, condemn, and destroy food and food related 
products that are not exclusively regulated by the USDA through the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act.  Under the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism 
Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, the FDA may detain food for up to 30 days 
without the need for a court order.  This act also authorizes FDA to establish record-
keeping requirements for food companies (United States Government Accountability 
Office 2004b).  Along with its food related responsibilities, the FDA is in charge of 
ensuring the safety of a very broad range of products that also include animal drugs 
and feeds, human medicines and vaccines, radiation-emitting devices, medical devices, 
blood and blood products, and cosmetics (United States Government Accountability 
Office 2008).  It is estimated that the FDA is responsible for regulation of about 80 
percent of the food supply (United States Government Accountability Office 2007a). 
The USDA and FDA employ a classification system for recalls based on the 
potential health risk that the food in question poses.  Recalls range from Class I to Class 
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III, with Class I being the most serious.  Class I recalls are designated for foods that may 
pose a serious adverse health consequence or death.  These can include foods that are 
contaminated with Escherichia coli O157:H7, Listeria, Salmonella, or undeclared 
allergens such as peanuts and eggs.  Class II recalls are designated for foods that pose a 
remote possibility of adverse health effects or may cause temporary or reversible 
health effects.  Class III recalls are designated for foods that will not cause adverse 
health effects.  These can include foods that contain added water that is not disclosed 
on the label and foods that contain mold or insects (United States Government 
Accountability Office 2004b).   
Once a recall is issued, the USDA and FDA have separate but similar procedures 
for alerting the public and the parties involved in the recall event.  The USDA will issue a 
press release for Class I and Class II recalls on their Recall Web website that describes 
the product, the reason for the recall, the risk involved with consuming the product, 
instructions on what to do with the product, and the contact information of the 
recalling firm.  The FDA generally requires the company with the recall to issue a press 
release for all Class I recalls.  The FDA provides a model for the firm to follow which 
covers the product, reason for recall, risk involved with consumption, instructions on 
what to do with the product, and contact information.  The press releases are posted 
and archived on its Recall Enterprise System website (United States Government 
Accountability Office 2004b). 
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After the press release is given, both the USDA and FDA begin the process of 
directly alerting customers and providing them with instructions for return or disposal 
of the product.  The USDA’s and FDA’s primary roles are to verify that firms and 
customers along the downstream supply chain are notified, the product is located, and 
the product is removed from the marketplace.  For each case, depending on the health 
risk associated with the recall, a percentage of customers to be contacted and verified 
is determined.  Once the product is recovered, USDA and FDA may require that 
inspectors be present to witness the destruction and final state of the recalled product 
(United States Government Accountability Office 2004b). 
USDA and FDA do have a number of severe limitations to their respective 
authorities over food recall events.  In the United States, the vast majority of food 
recalls are voluntary.  Agencies do not have the authority to force companies to carry 
out recalls, with the exception that FDA may require a recall for infant formula (United 
States Government Accountability Office 2007a).  They also do not generally have the 
authority to publically reveal retail stores that may be selling recalled food because it is 
considered to be confidential business information (United States Government 
Accountability Office 2004b).  The agencies also have limited access to firms’ records 
during a recall event and are sometimes required to gain access through state agencies 
that may have broader authority (United States Government Accountability Office 
2008). 
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Other federal agencies and similar agencies in other countries have much 
broader recall authority over the products in their respective jurisdictions.  In the 
United States, the Consumer Products Safety Commission has authority over a vast 
array of consumer products that range from toys to household chemicals.  The National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration covers motor vehicles, motor vehicle equipment, 
child safety seats, and tires.  Both agencies may require a company to notify the agency 
of distribution of a potentially unsafe product, order a recall, establish recall 
requirements, and impose penalties, fines, and seek imprisonment if the firm violates 
the recall requirements.  In Canada, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency has authority 
over all foods sold in Canada.  It may issue a mandatory recall, establish recall 
requirements, and impose penalties, fines, and seek imprisonment (United States 
Government Accountability Office 2004b). 
Jurisdictional hindrances between the USDA and FDA also lead to complications 
when conducting food recalls.  These complications may stem from ingredients 
involved in the production process to packaging of the finished product.  One example 
deals with frozen pizzas and their ingredients.  If meat is used as a topping, the USDA is 
charged with inspection.  If the pizza is vegetarian or cheese, FDA handles inspection.  
Another example deals with ham and cheese sandwiches and the method by which 
they are packaged.  If the sandwich is packed with a slice of bread and is open-faced, 
the USDA inspects the manufacturer.  If the sandwich has two slices of bread and is 
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closed-faced, then FDA conducts inspection (United States Government Accountability 
Office 2007a). 
An additional comprehensive and central source of information pertaining to 
food safety issues has been the result of an intragovernmental collaboration between 
the FDA, USDA, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).  A website, www.foodsafety.gov, is designed to 
provide accurate and reliable information such as safety alerts, recalls, health warnings, 
and the latest news to a wide audience of consumers, producers, and food 
professionals (Galson 2009). 
In order to give a brief insight to an actual recall event, a synopsis of a 2003-
2004 recall related to positive Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) as presented 
by the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) (2004a) will be provided.  
This particular recall had implications for both USDA and FDA. 
In early December 2003, an infected cow, along with 22 other non-infected 
cows were slaughtered at a facility in Washington State.  Due to the single cow’s 
inability to walk, it was tested for BSE by USDA in accordance with USDA BSE 
surveillance policy (Nolen 2004).  Fourteen days after slaughter, on December 23rd, test 
results returned as positive for BSE.  Within the day, USDA field staff was on the scene 
at the company’s slaughtering facility.  Within hours, it was determined that the event 
would be classified as a Class II recall only pertaining to production on the day in 
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question, as the company’s cleanup policies were sufficient not to warrant recall of 
additional days’ production.  A press release and Recall Notification Report were 
released to the media and the public. 
The next day, USDA’s Food Safety Inspection Service agency (FSIS) contacted the 
company’s three primary customers and obtained secondary customer lists.  In the 
following days, secondary and tertiary customers were contacted and notified of the 
recall event.  Of these contacts, it was required that 100 percent of primary customers, 
50 percent of secondary customers, and 20 percent of the known tertiary customers 
have onsite checks with every customer being contacted at least twice. 
Repeated mixing of recalled beef and non-recalled beef at primary customers’ 
facilities increased the number of carcasses in question from 23 to 43.  By the 26th of 
December, it was determined that recalled beef had been shipped within Washington 
and to Oregon.  On December 27th, the recall expanded to California and Nevada, and 
to Alaska, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, and Guam on December 28th.  On January 6th, 
Alaska, Hawaii, and Guam were released from the recall, as it was established that the 
possibly contaminated beef had not been shipped there. 
 In the end, it was determined that 713 customers that included 
processors, distributors, retailers, and storage facilities may have received the recalled 
beef, with 10,410 pounds of product being recalled.  However, over 64,000 pounds of 
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beef were returned or destroyed by customers in order to conform to the recall and 
avoid possible contamination. 
A second aspect of this event involved the FDA.  It was determined that parts of 
the initial animal that tested positive for BSE were sent to two rendering plants where 
the processed materials had the potential to be used in many products that could 
include cosmetics and vaccines.  The rendered products were not beef, poultry, or egg 
products for human consumption, and FDA, rather than USDA, had jurisdiction.  
The FDA was notified about the event on December 23rd and sent an inspection 
team to the receiving renderers the following day.  Both renderers voluntarily agreed to 
hold and destroy products that may have been contaminated. However, on January 7th, 
2004, 15 containers of potentially contaminated materials were accidentally shipped 
from Seattle to Asia.  Upon discovery, the material was returned to the United States 
and arrived on February 24th.  It was disposed of on March 2nd.  In all, an estimated 
2,000 tons of rendered material were held and destroyed. In early March 2004, the 
USDA’s Recall Management Division recommended termination of the recall and 
considered the event closed. 
The federal government has a history of enacting legislation with the purpose of 
improving food safety.  Following Upton Sinclair’s portrayal of the meatpacking industry 
in his work The Jungle (1906), Congress passed the Meat Inspection Act of 1906 and the 
Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906.  These were followed by additional regulations such as 
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the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, the Food Additives Amendment of 
1958, and the Color Additives Amendment of 1960 (Miller (1993); Reed (2005)). One 
key price of legislation that was enacted with the purpose of improving food safety, 
especially in the meat and poultry sectors, was the Pathogen Reduction Hazard Analysis 
Critical Control Program (PR/HACCP) of 1996.  
FSIS finalized the PR/HACCP rule on July 25th, 1996.  It was completely phased in 
by January 31st, 2000 (Keener 2007). According to Ollinger (2008) PR/HACCP stated 
that:  
(1) All meat and poultry slaughter and processing plants must develop, 
implement, and take responsibility for Standard Sanitation Operating 
Procedures (SSOPs) and a HACCP process control program.  
(2) All slaughter plants had to conduct generic E. coli microbial tests to verify 
control over fecal contamination. 
(3) All slaughter and ground meat plants had to comply with Salmonella 
standards established by FSIS in a testing program conducted by FSIS. 
For clarity, SSOPs are tasks that involve cleaning and sanitation that are implemented 
to augment pathogen control.  These tasks may include requirements to control and 
monitor rodent and pest infestations, harmful contaminations, and dripping 
13 
 
 
condensation.  HACCP programs monitor activities and actions if a critical control point 
deviates from an acceptable standard (Ollinger 2008). 
 To get a license to produce poultry and meat from FSIS, plants are required to 
meet the minimum standards set by the 1996 PR/HACCP rule.  However, industry and 
consumer standards have forced some firms to surpass the minimum standards set by 
the PR/HACCP rule.  Waldroup, et al. (1992) noted that an episode of the American 
television newsmagazine 60 Minutes highlighting the risks of Salmonella contamination 
pushed poultry slaughtering plants to develop and install improved scalders, washes, 
chlorine rinses, and other pathogen reducing technologies. Ollinger and Mueller  (2003) 
and Golan et al. (2004) noted that some major product purchasers, such as McDonalds 
and Jack-in-the-Box, mandated standards exceeding those required by FSIS.  These 
included mandatory testing and installation of the most recent pathogen-control 
equipment. 
 A study by Ollinger, Moore, and Chandran (2004) looked at the compliance 
costs of the 1996 PR/HACCP rule.  They examined the average costs for the highest and 
lowest quintiles with respect to plant size as measured in pounds of output and 
separated them as slaughtering and processing facilities. Ollinger (2008) interpreted 
that “if there were no economies of scale in the food safety process control, then the 
average cost per pound for plants in the top quintile would equal those costs in the 
lowest quintile.” The results from the Ollinger, Moore, and Chandran (2004), given in 
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Table 1, suggest economies–of-scale exist, with higher costs per pound in the smallest 
size grouping. 
 
Table 1. PR/HAACP Cost Increases with Plant Size 
Percentile of Plant 
Size 
Slaughter Processing 
 Cattle Hogs Chicken Cooked 
Meat 
Raw Meat 
Variable Costs Dollars per Pound 
0-19 0.023 0.016 0.025 0.018 0.020 
80-99 0.008 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.005 
Mean 0.022 0.014 0.010 0.016 0.013 
Fixed Costs Dollars per Pound 
0-19 0.055 0.050 0.013 0.079 0.027 
80-99 0.009 0.008 0.004 0.019 0.012 
Mean 0.022 0.026 0.008 0.036 0.017 
Number of Plants 135 96 58 198 139 
Source: (Ollinger, Moore and Chandran, Meat and Poultry Plants' Food Safety 
Investments: Survey Findings 2004), Page 26. 
 
 
 
 Ollinger (2008) notes that the Ollinger, Moore and Chandran (2004) study 
suggests that the 1996 PR/HACCP rule favors large plants to small plants.  This is a 
direct effect of economies-of-scale in variable and fixed costs in the meat and poultry 
industries.  It is also noted that small multi-product plants are likely to have higher 
absolute costs than large single-product plants as a separate HACCP plan is required for 
each product. 
 Ollinger (2008) conducted a study  and employed a least squares model to 
examine the direct and indirect costs of the 1996 PR/HACCP rule.  In the model, food 
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safety costs were regressed on proxies for wages, indirect private actions (human and 
physical capital), direct private market actions, and direct and indirect regulatory 
effects.   
 Food safety costs were defined as the costs of complying with the 1996 
PR/HACCP rule as a share of plant sales.  Wages,            , were defined as the 
average state wage for meat and poultry production workers in the state in which the 
plant was located.  The human capital component of indirect private actions, 
               , consisted of an experience dummy variable that equaled one for 
plants that had formal food safety process controls in place prior to the 1996 PR/HACCP 
rule and zero otherwise.  The physical capital component of indirect private 
actions,          , consisted of a plant-level index of food safety technology that 
ranged from zero to one with more sophisticated equipment use indicated by a higher 
value.  Direct private actions consisted of two variables: (1) a dummy 
variable,        ,that indicated the contractual agreements with buyers and was 
defined as one for plants with customers that specified more stringent safety 
requirements than those required by FSIS; (2) a dummy variable,          ,that 
indicated if a firm is vertically integrated.  The indirect regulation component consisted 
of three variables: (1) a variable,            , that measured the number of 
employees per plant; (2) a dummy variable,       ,that indicated if the plant was 
owned by a firm that owned more than one establishment; (3) a variable,          , 
that measured the capital-to-labor ratio.  The direct regulation component consisted of 
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four variables: (1) a variable,             , that measured the costs of developing the 
HACCP and SSOP plans as a share of plant sales; (2) a variable,            , that 
measured the number of SSOPs and HACCP tasks performed in 2001 in order to comply 
with the 1996 PR/HACCP rule divided by the total number of employees; (3) a variable, 
                 , that distinguishes the costs of HACCP tasks from SSOP tasks; (4) 
a variable,        , that measures the ratio of production workers hired to comply 
with the 1996 PR/HACCP rule divided by the total number of production and quality 
control workers hired to comply.  Additional details about the variables can be found in 
Ollinger (2008). 
 The model specified by Ollinger (2008) is presented as: 
                                                         
                                                     
                                                           
 Results of the empirical analysis concluded that economies-of-scale give a very 
large advantage to the largest plants over their smaller competitors in the 
implementation of food safety controls.  The results can be found in Appendix I, Table 
30. 
 
 
17 
 
 
2.2 Health Issues and Cost of Illnesses Due to Pathogens 
In order to have an appropriate understanding of the food safety issues facing 
the United States, it is imperative to appreciate some of the most important 
motivations behind food recall events.  We will now discuss several pathogens that 
result in recall events in the United States. 
A 1994 report by the Council for Agriculture and Science Technology (CAST) 
found that microbial pathogens in food resulted in 6.5 million-33 million cases of 
human illness and up to 9,000 deaths in the United States each year (CAST 1994). These 
pathogens are microorganisms that cause disease and include fungi, bacteria, parasites, 
and viruses.  A 1995 report by the Economic Research Service (ERS) division of the 
USDA estimated that seven foodborne pathogens resulted in between $5.6 billion and 
$9.4 billion in annual costs related to human illnesses.  Of this, meat and poultry 
sources were between $4.5 billion and $7.5 billion (Federal Register 1995). However, 
these estimates undervalue the true costs as it is believed that there are over 40 
foodborne pathogens that cause human illnesses (CAST 1994). 
Bean et al., (1990) found that of the four pathogen types, over 90 percent of all 
confirmed illnesses and deaths reported to the CDC were ascribed to bacteria. There 
are some pathogens that are carried by animals and do not cause animal diseases but 
do cause human illnesses.  One example is E. coli O157:H7.  Even though it lives 
harmlessly in the intestinal tracts of cattle, humans who eat rare or undercooked 
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hamburger meat from infected cattle are at risk of developing bloody diarrhea and 
kidney failure. Most contamination of meat and poultry occurs at or after slaughter.  A 
food scientist at Pennsylvania State University, Stephen Knabel, stated “only five 
percent of live poultry are contaminated with Salmonella, but after processing nearly 
half of the carcasses contain Salmonella” (Martz 1994-95). In poultry, cross 
contamination can occur at the defeathering , slaughtering, chilling, and processing 
stages. Widespread contamination of the packing line can occur due to accidental 
puncturing of the intestinal tract during slaughter.   Improper pasteurization of raw milk 
may allow Listeria to survive and grow in refrigerated milk. 
The three categories of human illnesses caused by microbial pathogens are: 
foodborne infections, foodborne toxicoinfections, and foodborne intoxications (CAST 
1994). 
When pathogens are eaten and are then established in the body, foodborne 
infections can occur. These pathogens multiply in the intestinal tract, irritate the lining 
of the intestines, and cause illness.  Examples of these pathogens are Listeria, 
Salmonella, and Campylobacter (CAST 1994) . 
When pathogens emit dangerous or lethal toxins while in the intestinal tracts, 
foodborne toxicoinfections can occur. The toxic byproducts, rather than the pathogens 
themselves, cause the illnesses.  Examples of pathogens that can produce 
toxicoinfections are Clostridium perfringens and E. coli O157:H7 (CAST 1994). 
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When food is consumed that contains mycotoxins produced by molds or toxins 
released during the growth stages of certain bacteria, foodborne intoxication can occur.  
Staphylococcus aureus is an example of such a pathogen.  Illnesses tend to be sudden 
as they do not require establishment or a growth stage in the body (CAST 1994). 
Most cases of foodborne illness are defined as acute but may result in chronic 
aftereffects. They tend to have rapid inception and are self-limiting where the body is 
able to damage and excrete the pathogen.  Symptoms that are common include 
gastrointestinal difficulties and vomiting.  A study by Archer and Kvenberg (1985) found 
that between two percent and three percent of acute cases develop into chronic, long-
term aftereffects. 
Buzby et al. (1996) conducted a comprehensive examination of the costs 
associated with food safety related illnesses.  Here, we will provide a synopsis of their 
study with some additional information about several specific pathogens and their 
aftereffects.  
 Economic theory provides a precise framework that associates the benefits of 
risk reduction with the amount that people are willing to pay to achieve the reduction, 
and suggests methods of measuring those benefits (Just, Hueth and Schmitz 1982). 
There are two primary methods of benefit estimation that can be practically applied to 
human illnesses.  The first method, willingness-to-pay (WTP), aims to estimate the 
value that individuals place on reductions in risk to identify the value to society of 
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publicly provided risk reduction.  The second method, cost-of-illness (COI), measures 
the costs of an illness to an economy, via effects on current and future gross domestic 
product (GDP). 
 COI measures have been widely used for some time and the data utilized in the 
analyses are both meticulous and available.  The COI method measures the sum of 
medical expenses, foregone earnings, and productivity losses (Buzby et al. 1996). 
 The COI method does have some potential shortcomings.  It does not recognize 
the value of feeling healthy, avoiding pain, or usage of free time.  It has been argued, 
that these, along with placing a low valuation on reducing the risk to the elderly and 
children, forces the COI to underestimate the genuine societal benefits from risk 
reduction (Buzby et al. 1996). 
 COI studies are capable of estimating separate values for foregone earnings for 
illnesses and deaths.  COI methods may give conservative benefit measures for publicly 
provided risk reduction when compared to WTP methods. 
 The study by Buzby, et al. (1996) employed the COI method. We will now delve 
into four specific pathogens discussed in that work.  The pathogens examined include 
Salmonella, Campylobacter, E. coli O157:H7, and Listeria. 
Salmonella is the principle cause of documented foodborne illnesses in most 
developed countries (CAST 1994). The ten most common serotypes of Salmonella are 
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responsible for over 70 percent of human illnesses in the United States. The three most 
prevalent serotypes responsible for human illnesses are S. typhimurium, S. enteritidis, 
and S. heidelberg. S. enteritidis is frequent in poultry and eggs.  S. typhimurium is 
common in beef products. Salmonella may also be found in contaminated vegetables, 
fruits, and even marijuana (Helmick et al. 1994). 
The most common Salmonella triggered illness is gastroenteritis which is an 
inflammation in the lining of the stomach or intestines. It is known as salmonellosis and 
is often contracted after consuming contaminated food (Benenson 1990).  Symptoms 
may include abdominal discomfort, diarrhea, dehydration, fever, headache, nausea, 
stomachache, and vomiting and usually last less than one day. Many people who 
contract salmonellosis believe that they have stomach flu (Tauxe 1987).  Rarely, the 
bacteria can enter the bloodstream and result in bacteremia or septicemia (bacterial 
blood poisoning), both of which can be deadly.  However, deaths are uncommon 
(Merck & Company, Inc. 1992).  The elderly, very young, and those that are 
immunocompromised (e.g. those with cancer, sickle cell anemia, and AIDS) are the 
most susceptible to infection by Salmonella. 
Buzby et al. (1996) used three sources to estimate the number of annual 
salmonellosis cases: surveillance data, outbreak data, and extrapolations from the 
surveillance and outbreak data.  It was estimated that between 800,000 and 4 million 
cases of Salmonella occur annually in the United States.  Of these, between 696,000 
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and 3,840,000 cases were from food sources.  The estimated annual human illness 
costs of foodborne salmonellosis were estimated to be between $600 million and $3.5 
billion. A detailed breakdown is provided in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Salmonellosis Cases and Costs 
Disease Severity  Annual Number of Cases Annual Costs of Disease  
No Physician Visit 746,880 to 3,734,400 $276.8 million to $1.384 billion 
Physician Visit Only 40,320 to 201,600 $32 million to $160 million 
Hospitalized  12,000 to 60,000 $109 million to $545.2 million 
Deaths 800 to 4,000 $7.3 million to $36.3 million 
Source: (Buzby et al. 1996). 
 
 
Of the species of Campylobacter, there are nine that are believed to be 
pathogenic to humans.  Campylobacter coli and Campylobacter jejuni are the primary 
species associated with incidence of campylobacteriosis in humans (Tauxe et al. 1988).  
C. coli infections are principally related with consumption of pork and C. jejuni 
infections are primarily connected with consumption of poultry (Buzby et al. 1996). 
Campylobacteriosis can result in symptoms that range from mild diarrhea and 
lethargy that lasts for as little as one day to severe diarrhea, abdominal pain, fever, and 
further complications that can last for several weeks (Park, Griffiths and Moreno 1991). 
Most cases are relatively mild and result in abdominal pain and diarrhea.  
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Campylobacteriosis has an incubation period that can last from one to ten days with 
most subjects experiencing illness between three and five days (Benenson 1990).  
Prolonged illness and complications that last longer than one week are found to 
occur in up to 20 percent of campylobacteriosis cases (Blaser et al. 1979).  These 
complications can include meningitis, cholecystitis (gall bladder inflammation), urinary 
tract infection, appendicitis, septicemia, and Reiter syndrome (bacterial induced 
arthritis) (Mossel (1988); University of Maryland Medical Center (2009)).   
The largest source of cases of Campylobacter coli/jejuni in the United States can 
be traced to ingestion of chicken (Harris, Weiss and Nolan 1986). Up to 80 percent of 
poultry at the retail market have been found to be contaminated with Campylobacter 
(Skirrow and Blaser 1992).  Other minor foodborne sources have included raw milk, raw 
clams, raw hamburger, turkey, cake icing, pork, and water (Benenson (1990); Blaser, 
Taylor, & Feldman (1983); Stern (1992); Tauxe et al. (1988); CAST (1994)).  A 
surveillance study by the Seattle-King County Department of Public Health found that 
around 55 percent of Campylobacter cases are the result of consumption of food 
(Seattle-King County Department of Publc Health 1984). Buzby et al. (1996) estimated 
that the incidence was between 55 percent and 70 percent. 
Following the surveillance work of Rosenberg et al. (1977); Blaser, Wells et 
al.(1983); Tauxe (1992); and Helmick et al. (1994), Buzby et al. (1996) estimated that 
the annual number of cases of campylobacteriosis were 2.5 million.  Of these, between 
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1,375,000 and 1,750,000 were foodborne. Medical and productivity costs ranged from 
$600 million to $1 billion. A detailed breakdown is provided in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Campylobacteriosis Cases and Costs 
Disease Severity  Annual Number of Cases Annual Costs of Disease  
No Physician Visit 2,351,770 to 2,352,300 $871.7 million to $871.9 million 
Physician Visit Only 135,000  $107.2 million 
Hospitalized  12,500  $113.6 million 
Deaths 200 to 730 $77.1 million to $281.3 million 
Source: (Buzby et al. 1996) 
 
 
E. coli O157:H7 is a toxicoinfective microorganism as it causes illness through 
the toxins that it produces. The toxins adhere to kidney, intestine, and central nervous 
system receptors where they kill cells and prevent protein synthesis (CAST 1994). 
Severity of illness associated with E. coli O157:H7 ranges from mild cases of 
acute diarrhea lasting six to eight days to premature death (Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (1993), Buzby et al. (1996)). Acute illness symptoms include abdominal 
cramps, vomiting, diarrhea that is often bloody, and fever (Buzby et al. 1996). The 
commonly reported symptom of bloody diarrhea is instigated by the toxins and the 
partial destruction of the mucosal lining of the colon (United States Department of 
Agriculture: Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 1994). A study conducted in 
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Washington State found that 95 percent of reported E. coli O157:H7 disease had bloody 
diarrhea (Ostroff, Kobayashi and Lewis 1989).   
More severe cases of E. coli O157:H7 infections can result in hemmorhagic 
colitis (bloody inflammation of the colon) (Buzby, et al. 1996).  Most hemmorhagic 
colitis cases fully recover within six to eight days of onset (Griffin and Tauxe 1991).  
Fewer than five percent of E. coli O157:H7 cases will develop into the life-threatening 
illness, hemolytic uremic syndrome (HUS).  HUS is commonly characterized by red 
blood cell destruction, kidney failure, and neurological complications such as strokes 
and seizures (McCarthy (1993), American Gastroenterological Association (1995)).  
Lifelong dialysis may be required for those that develop chronic kidney failure.  Other 
complications can include nervous system deterioration, blindness, and partial paralysis 
(Merck & Company, Inc. 1992).  As a result, many patients that develop HUS will die 
(Buzby, et al. 1996). 
Bovine products are responsible for most foodborne cases of E. coli O157:H7 in 
the United States.  Contamination tends to occur upon slaughter.  The microorganisms 
can live harmlessly in the gastrointestinal tracts of poultry and farm animals.  Other 
products that have been linked to E. coli O157:H7 contamination include mayonnaise, 
apple cider, vegetables, hot dogs, raw milk, raw potatoes, turkey, ranch dressing, pea 
salad, cantaloupe, and water (Griffin and Tauxe (1991), United States Department of 
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Agriculture: Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (1994), American 
Gastroenterological Association (1995)). 
Following research by MacDonald et al. (1988); Ostroff, Kobayashi and Lewis 
(1989); Martin et al. (1990); Griffin and Tauxe (1991); and American 
Gastroenterological Association (1995), Buzby et al. (1996) estimated that the annual 
number of cases of E. coli O157:H7 disease were between 10,000 and 20,000.  Of these, 
it was estimated that 80 percent were foodborne with costs ranging between $200 
million and $600 million per year.  A detailed breakdown is provided in Table 4. 
 
Table 4. E. coli O157:H7 Disease Cases and Costs 
Disease Severity  Annual Number of Cases Annual Costs of Disease  
No Physician Visit 5,000 to 10,000 $900,000 to $1.8 million 
Physician Visit Only 3,200 to 6,400  $1.6 million to $4.2 million 
Hospitalized  1,600 to 3,100 $31.2 million to $62.4 million 
Deaths 200 to 500 $241.7 million to $604.2 million 
Source: (Buzby et al. 1996) 
 
 
 Undercooked hamburger consumption has been identified a risk factor for E. 
coli O157:H7 infection (Slutsker et al. 1998). A study by Ralston et al. (2001) looked at 
the recommendation that individuals cook hamburgers thoroughly and order them to 
be cooked thoroughly in restaurants.  They incorporated surveys to indicate how 
consumers cook and order hamburgers using doneness descriptive such as rare, 
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medium-rare, medium, medium-well, and well-done, as well as color descriptive such 
as red, pink, light brown, and dark brown.  It is recommended that thermometers are 
used so that hamburgers are cooked to a temperature of 160 degrees Fahrenheit by 
FSIS, the FDA, and the CDC (USDA: FSIS 1998a).  Color has been found to be an 
unreliable indicator of whether a hamburger has been thoroughly cooked in several 
studies (Mendenhall (1989), Berry & Stanfield (1993), USDA: FSIS (1998b), Killenger, et 
al. (2000)).  
 The study by Ralston et al. (2001) utilized the 1996 Hamburger and Egg 
Consumption Diary (HECD) and the Hamburger Preparation Quiz (HPQ), both 
conducted by the Market Research Corporation of America.  The HECD was used to 
estimate the proportion of hamburgers consumed with a red or pink center.  The HPQ 
was used to examine how cooking and ordering behaviors had changed over a five year 
period from 1991 to 1996, the risks associated with palatability characteristics (taste, 
texture, and juiciness) of hamburgers between demographics, and consumers’ 
attitudes toward risk and hamburger characteristics in doneness choices. 
 Following the research of Marks et al. (1998), Ralston et al. (2001) calculated 
the probabilities of infection based on the doneness of a hamburger. Also calculated 
was the probability of a hamburger being cooked rare at home, rare at a restaurant, 
medium-rare at home, medium-rare at a restaurant, and the proportions of 
hamburgers cooked at home, at restaurants, and at other locations.  As a result, it was 
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estimated that a reduction in the probability of illness of 4.6 percent may be attributed 
to diminution in medium-rare and rare hamburger consumption due to foodborne 
illness concern.  This leads to an estimated annual medical and productivity savings of 
$7.4 million due to a risk reduction of E. coli O175:H7. 
Listeria monocytogenes  is the infectious bacterium that is responsible for the 
disease listeriosis (Buzby et al. 1996).  Listeriosis is usually either mild or very severe 
(CAST 1994).  Sudden fever, severe headache, vomiting, and other flu-like symptoms 
are characteristics of mild cases of listeriosis. More severe cases of listeriosis may 
develop into septicemia and/or meningoencephalitis (simultaneous inflammation or 
infection of the meninges and of the brain) that can result in delirium, coma, or death 
(Benenson (1990); University of Maryland Medical Center (2009)).  Well-defined risk 
groups for listeriosis infection include pregnant women, newborn/fetal cases, the 
elderly, and the immunocropromised (Roberts and Pinner 1990).  Listeriosis has an 
incubation period of between four days and several weeks and a duration period that 
may last from a few days to several weeks (CAST 1994). 
 Schuchat (1994) stated that roughly 85 percent to 95 percent of all listeriosis 
cases in the United States are foodborne.  Listeria can grow under refrigeration and has 
been isolated in food products such as raw milk, vegetables, seafood, poultry, red 
meat, and liquid whole eggs, (CAST 1994). Pinner et al. (1992) found that Listeria can 
rapidly replicate in hot dogs, soft cheeses, and pâté. 
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 Following the research of Roberts and Pinner (1990) and Gellin et al. (1987), 
Buzby et al. (1996) estimated that there were between 1,795 and 1,860 cases of acute 
listeriosis and 43 cases of chronic listeriosis in the United States annually.  Under the 
assumption that 85 percent to 95 percent of listeriosis cases are foodborne, they 
estimated that a yearly cost ranging from $200 million to $300 million can be attributed 
to foodborne listeriosis in the United States. 
 In the next subsection, we would like to discuss a few issues from management 
literature and studies of recall events in other industries.  The management topics will 
pertain to product traceability and decision making within the firm. 
2.3 Management Issues 
Product traceability has become a major issue in the face of food safety 
concerns. Regattieri, Gamberi and Manzini (2007) defined traceability as: 
“the history of a product in terms of the direct properties of that product 
and/or properties that are associated with that product once these products 
have been subject to particular value-adding processes using associated 
production means and in associated environmental conditions.”   
Complexities of the food sector rarely allow for full and transparent traceability to 
occur under the umbrella of a single enterprise.  Few firms control all processes along 
the supply chain from farm to processor to retail.  Therefore, development of tracking 
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and tracing capabilities requires coordination between many entities including 
producers, manufacturers, retailers, and regulators.  
Ideally, traceability would allow for any product to be identified back to its 
initial source and forward to its final destination from any stage in the supply chain.  
These are the concepts of backward tracing and forward tracing.  Along with the ability 
to identify the actual location of the product at any given time, backward and forward 
tracing are components of the greater idea of tracing capability (Porter 1985). 
According to Fritz and Schiefer (2009), the primary issue in a tracking and tracing 
methodology is the identification and isolation of units of production and trade and 
their movements through and between processes and firms from origin to destination. 
However, it should be noted that in many circumstances the ideal traceability 
model is impossible to achieve at this time.  One major hurdle in full traceability in the 
food sector occurs at the commodity level.  In many instances, it is impractical to 
segregate bulk commodities that have arrived from the farm to storage or shipping 
facilities based on origin.  There are possible solutions for these problems that are the 
direct result of recent technological advancements. One potential method suggests 
that radio-frequency identification (RFID) tracking devices might take the shape of 
individual cereal grains and become part of the production batch (Fritz and Schiefer 
2009). 
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Another problem facing full traceability is the result of the “natural and 
increasing spatial distances between the rural areas of production and the urban areas 
of consumption.” (Fritz and Schiefer 2009)  Physical distances, globalization, and an 
increasing number of intermediaries in the production process escalate the 
complexities of recording and maintaining accurate information at each level.   
A firm’s strategy for dealing with a product problem and the perceptions that 
are involved with the formation of this strategy are complex issues.  Firms may take a 
proactive and responsible recall strategy or a passive and defensive recall strategy 
(Siomkos and Kurzbard 1994).  One idea implies that a proactive approach may result in 
positive consumer perceptions while the other implies that the same strategy may 
instigate negative investor perceptions (Chen, Ganesan and Liu 2009).  Both parties, 
consumers and investors, are extremely important to the firm and will be influential in 
the strategic decision making process. 
The firm typically controls the greatest amount of private information about a 
product involved in the recall process.  It knows the nature of the hazard and potential 
stock market consequences.  This knowledge is due to the firm’s consumer proximity, 
knowledge of the production process, and regular communication with regulators 
(Chen, Ganesan and Liu 2009). 
A proactive firm is likely to issue a voluntary recall of a product even if a 
potential hazard is identified internally and is not the result of a regulatory discovery.  
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One example of such an event is the February 15, 2007 recall of 500,000 toys by the 
Fisher-Price arm of Mattel, Inc.  The firm issued the recall as the result of internal 
testing’s indication that the products may prove to be a choking hazard even though no 
incidents of injuries had been reported by consumers (Chen, Ganesan and Liu 2009). 
A passive firm is likely to delay the recall process or attempt to force 
responsibility onto other entities.  One example of this strategy is Playskool’s recall of 
255,000 toys. This recall occurred only after the death of two toddlers when the 
possible hazards were known by the firm beforehand (Chen, Ganesan and Liu 2009). 
It seems that positive consumer perceptions are a result of proactive recall 
strategies. Siegel and Vitaliano (2007) found that firms were perceived as being of 
higher quality if they acted in a socially responsible manner.  Siomkos and Kurzbard 
(1994) found consumers’ perceptions of a firm and their future purchase intentions 
were fostered by a more active firm response to a product problem.  Chen, Ganesan 
and Liu (2009) note that trustworthiness and positive customer care can be indicated 
by a proactive strategy. 
On the other hand, investors and the stock market may interpret a proactive 
strategy as “a signal of severe product hazard and financial damage” (Chen, Ganesan 
and Liu 2009).  Investors’ primary concern is the firm’s ability to maintain positive and 
vibrant cash flow in the short-run.  Their study consistently found that negative returns 
are associated with proactive recall strategies.  Therefore, they interpret a firm’s quick 
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actions as an indicator of the severity of the possible financial consequences of a crisis 
event and that there were no other choices available but to issue a proactive recall. 
It seems that firms’ recall strategies are influenced in a number of ways.  
Depending on management’s level of accountability to investors, a firm may be inclined 
to position the desires of investors as a priority over the safety of consumers. 
Salin and Hooker (2001) examined the reactions of shareholder returns due to 
food safety incidents.  Their study focused on microbiological contamination events 
with market reaction quantified by shareholders’ investment in common stock of 
publically traded food processing firms.  Their study concentrated on four recall events 
representing firms of various size and business practices.  One event was linked to 
Listeria contamination at Sara Lee Food’s Bil-Mar Foods packaged meats subsidiary.  
Two events were linked to E.coli O175:H7 contamination of ground beef at IBP, Inc.  
The final recall examined was also associated with E.coli O157:H7, but was 
contaminated apple juice produced by Odwalla, Inc. 
Salin and Hooker (2001) conducted an event study to measure the impact of 
these recall events on the value of the respective firms.  This was accomplished by 
estimating the “normal return” of the stock and then comparing it to the actual return 
over a period surrounding the recall event.  Abnormal returns were estimated as the 
difference between the predicted return and the actual return. 
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The study found that for the smallest firm, Odwalla, returns to shareholders fell 
immediately after the recall event.  However, large reductions in returns were not 
consistently associated with recalls by the larger firms.  They proposed that this 
consequence may be the result of other factors such as outside business diversification, 
intensity of press coverage, or timeliness of the recall event. 
2.4 Recall Studies from Other Industries 
The case studies on recall events deal with issues in the pharmaceutical and 
automotive industries. A paper by McGhan and Block (1987) studied the implications of 
the size of pharmaceutical companies and the number of drug recall events per firm.  
The variable used to relate the size of the firm was sales. Their study classified 
pharmaceutical firms into two groups:  (1) generally smaller, nonresearch-oriented 
firms, and (2) larger, research-oriented firms.  The premise of the research was to 
determine if the smaller, nonresearch-oriented firms produced drugs that were equal 
in quality to those produced by the larger, research-oriented firms.  It was understood 
that lower quality drugs were indicative of recall events. Their study examined 3,720 
recall events and court actions over a period from 1970-1979. 
Like food safety recall events, most recalls in the McGahn and Block study were 
voluntarily issued by the firms upon identification of a problem.  If an involuntary recall 
was required, the FDA could initiate a court action that could result in seizures, 
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injunctions, and prosecutions. Over the period of the study, only 299 of the 3,720 
events were the consequence of FDA court actions. 
McGahn and Block estimated the number of recalls, the average number of 
units per recall, the average cost per unit recalled, the total units recalled, and the total 
cost of recalls for nonresearch-oriented and research-oriented firms.  This information 
is provided in Table 5. 
 
Table 5. Pharmaceutical Recalls by Firm Size (1970-1978) 
 Nonresearch-Oriented Firms Research-Oriented Firms 
Number of Recall Events 2,970 451 
Average Number of Units   
     Recalled 
794,106 1,044,613 
Average Cost Per Unit  
     Recalled 
$0.34 
 
$0.65 
Total Units Recalled 2,358 million 471 million 
Total Cost of Recalls $803 million $305 million 
Source: Drug Recalls and Court Actions: A Comparison of Research-Intensive and  
Nonresearch-Intensive Pharmaceutical Firms, McGahn and Block, 1987, (p. 187). 
 
 
 
McGahn and Block found a significant difference in the average number of 
recalls and citations per firm between research-intensive and nonresearch-intensive 
firms.  They found that there was a positive correlation between sales volume and the 
number of recalls and citations.  They also found that larger firms generally had a lower 
percentage of their product involved in a recall. 
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 A study by Rupp (2004) considered the effects of recall events in the automotive 
industry.  Specifically, the study looked at the adjusted percentage cumulative 
abnormal return (CAR) in the stock price of a firm that could not be explained by the 
overall movement of the automotive industry following a recall event.  A wide range of 
defective components, recall characteristics, and company characteristics were 
considered as possible explanatory variables for the CAR.  The defective components 
ranged from air bags and brakes to engines and seat belts.  Recall characteristics 
included the age of the automobile model, if the recall was the first for the model, and 
if the government initiated the recall, among others.  Company characteristics 
considered if the company had a AAA bond rating and a variable that measured market 
capitalization.  For this study, the market capitalization was selected as a firm size 
measurement variable as other measurements may have been unavailable.  Market 
capitalization was defined as the stock price multiplied by the number of outstanding 
shares. 
 The study by Rupp (2004) collected data for cars and trucks in the United States 
over a period from 1973 to 1998. The data was obtained from the Wall Street Journal 
Index of Automotive Recall Announcements and contained records of the six largest 
automobile manufacturers in the United States.  The data used to calculate the market 
capitalization variable was collected from the Center for Research in Security Prices at 
the University of Chicago.  During the twenty-six year sample period, 592 safety recall 
announcements were published.  These involved an estimated 138 million vehicles 
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produced by the six manufacturers.  The events ranged widely in size from a recall of 39 
Buick Reattas with faulty air bag sensors to a 7.9 million vehicle recall due to defective 
ignition switches by the Ford Motor Company. 
 Rupp (2004) conducted twelve models with varying fixed and random effects of 
manufacturers and years.  Two of the models that included fixed year effects to capture 
changes over time during the sample period and excluded fixed manufacturer effects 
found significance in the natural log of the market capitalization variable.  This 
indicated that firm size had an effect on the CAR under a product recall for these two 
models. It was concluded that firms with larger                           have 
smaller losses in the stock market following recall announcements. 
In this literature review, we have discussed key topics related to food safety 
recall events.  These have included the regulatory structure of the food system in the 
United States, several primary causes of recall events, management issues that relate 
to recalls, and recalls stemming in other industries.  This assessment will support the 
framework of our analysis and examination of food safety recalls that have occurred in 
the United States in the past several years.  We will now transition into the description 
of the data to be used in our analysis with the principal target of providing a broad 
prospective prior to developing the model and our hypotheses. 
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3. DATA DESCRIPTION 
The data to be utilized in this examination have been acquired from several 
sources.  Numerous individuals have worked on the collection and organization of the 
data.  With the aid of data management and analysis software such as Microsoft Excel 
and Statistical Analysis System (SAS), the task has been facilitated.  In this section, we 
will first describe the datasets and information contained therein.  We will then discuss 
the process by which they were organized and combined.   
The datasets can be classified into three categories: 
(1) Individual recall events; 
(2) Corporate financial and details about the recall events; and 
(3) Corporate family information. 
Datasets of the first category, relating to individual recall events, were collected 
from press releases issued by the FDA and FSIS.  The information collected from FDA 
was gathered from its Archive for Recalls, Market Withdrawals and Safety Alerts 
website (United States Food and Drug Administration 2009). The information from FSIS 
was collected via its Recall Case Archive website (United States Department of 
Agriculture: Food Safety Inspection Service 2009). The recall events span a period from 
January, 2000 through October, 2009.  We believe that the recall data contain most 
every recall event issued by the FDA and FSIS over that period and that it is one of the 
most comprehensive datasets located outside of the federal government regarding 
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food safety recalls.  From the recall dataset, observations contain comprehensive 
information on: date of the recall event; firm; city and state of the firm involved; type 
of firm involved as manufacturer, retailer, or a combination of the two; recall problem; 
how the problem was discovered; and contact information.  Additional information, 
albeit not as exhaustive, is available on recall class as a measure of recall severity, 
illnesses reported, total pounds recalled, and the number of states to which the 
product was distributed. We should mention that both FDA and FSIS only report 
information on firms that have experienced recall events. In this original dataset, there 
were 2,443 recall events reported. 
The second dataset category relates to corporate financial information and 
details about the recall events.  There were five original datasets of this type.  The 
information was collected from the Hoover’s Company Information Database (2009).  
The information contained in these firm datasets provide sales figures, number of 
employees, percentage of sales growth, percentage of employee growth, a binary 
variable equal to one if a firm has a brand and zero otherwise, and the number of 
brands per firm.  It should be noted that if we were unable to observe if a firm had a 
brand and subsequently the number of brands that the firm had, we assumed that the 
firm did not have a brand.  Therefore, we coded both the binary variable and the brand 
count variable for such firms as zero.  It should also be noted that firm level sales and 
employment numbers data are spaced across several years. While most of the data are 
in terms of 2008 figures, the Hoover’s database also contained 2007 and 2009 figures. 
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The data on sales and employment numbers were pooled over dates into two new 
variables: most recent sales (MRS) and most recent employees (MRE). MRS and MRE 
contain the most recently available information that was obtainable for the individual 
firms. There are a total of 1,143 firm level observations in these datasets. 
The final category of datasets contains information on the corporate structure 
of the final parent companies of the firms.  Two datasets contain information from the 
Food Business Review Database (2009), the Funding Universe Database (2010), and 
MintGlobal (Bureau van Dijk 2009) relating corporate parents to their subsidiaries.  In 
this research, we feel that the best representation of the overall safety of the firm and 
the implication of recall events can be viewed at the corporate level.  These datasets 
contain a total of 2,273 observations. 
The organization and combination of the data into one useable and functional 
dataset was a tedious project.  The first step was to combine the five corporate and 
technical information datasets into a single dataset.  The same procedure was 
completed to combine the parent-subsidiary datasets into a single dataset.  At this 
point, there were three datasets, one for each dataset category.  Next, a corporate 
level code was created.  The code provided a unique number for each corporate parent 
company and assigned the same number to each of the company’s subsidiaries.  The 
next step was to delve into the corporate information and recall datasets and match 
the correct parent company code to the firms given in these datasets.  This procedure 
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had to be conducted on an observation by observation basis due to discrepancies in the 
firm names.  Once this process was complete, the recall dataset and the financial and 
technical dataset were merged into one by the company code.  This dataset is the 
primary dataset that will be used in the analysis and contains 1125 observations. 
A final key variable had to be constructed for the model analysis to be 
conducted.  This variable, known as        , provides the number of days between 
recall recurrences for a firm.  For example, if the first recall event for firm XYZ occurred 
on October 21st, 2003 and the second recall event occurred on December 2nd, 2003, 
then the         would equal 42.  There were 42 days between the first and second 
recall events for firm XYZ.  
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4. METHODOLOGY, DISCUSSION OF VARIABLES, & HYPOTHESES 
In this analysis, we will utilize survival analysis techniques.  Survival analysis 
procedures have been employed extensively in demographic and medical research.  
The methods have been well established in Cox (1972), Anderson & Gill (1982), Elandt-
Johnson & Johnson (1999), Lee & Wang (2003), Der & Everitt (2009), and others.  This 
study will utilize similar approaches used in these works and apply them to the food 
recall data.  For an individual firm, multiple recall events and the periods of time 
between them are easily observed.  In our study, survival is equivalent to risk of 
recurrence and we may be able to say something about proactive indicators of the next 
recall event. 
In this analysis, the event will be defined as the occurrence of a food safety 
recall by an individual firm.  It is quite possible that for a firm, the event may be 
recurrent.   The statistical procedures to handle recurrences will be considered later in 
the study, once the basic methodology is explained.  
In order to employ survival analysis procedures for this investigation, first the 
unit of analysis needs to be defined. The corporate firm in question will be the unit of 
analysis and the individual firms in the recall database will be traced back to the 
ultimate corporate parent.  This will allow for an enhanced depiction of the corporate 
management influence over the overall firm and its subsidiaries.   
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4.1 Survival and Hazard Functions 
 Following the methods of Der and Everitt (2009), we will define the survival and 
hazard functions to be used in our model. 
Defining   as the survival time, the survival function     , is the probability that 
an individual (or firm in our case) survives longer than   without a failure (recall) event.  
In our analysis,   is defined as the duration without a recall event. 
(1)              
The graph of      against  , known as the survival curve, can then be obtained. The 
Kaplan-Meier estimator,  ̂     will be used to obtain an estimate of      (Kaplan and 
Meier 1958).   Survival curves provide information on the chance that subjects do not 
experience the recall. Hence, longer survival is positive in terms of food safety 
performance. 
The hazard function,       will be defined as the probability that a firm 
experiences the event in a small time interval  , given that the firm has survived up to 
the start of this interval. 
(2)              
                                  
 
 
This is also known as the instantaneous failure rate or in medical and demographic 
analysis, as the age-specific failure rate.  For our analysis, it will be a measure of the risk 
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of recurrence of a recall event.  The hazard function can then be calculated by defining 
it as an operation of the cumulative distribution and the probability density function of 
survival time (Der and Everitt 2009).  
(3)      
    
      
 
    
    
. 
By employing the Kaplan-Meier estimator of the survival function, we can obtain an 
estimator of the hazard function as: 
(4)  ̂    
    
 ̂   
. 
4.2 Cox’s Regression 
 In our analysis, we will employ Cox’s proportional hazard model to determine 
the relationship of the response to our explanatory variables. We need Cox’s regression 
because the response variable is a potentially censored survival time.  The Cox 
regression is semi-parametric as it does not require the probability distribution for the 
survival time to be specified.  The hazard function is used as an instrument for 
modeling as it does not necessitate the cumulative history of events.  Care must be 
taken not to model the hazard function as linear with respect to the explanatory 
variables as the hazard function is strictly positive (Der and Everitt 2009).  Since it may 
be the case that the hazards may increase or decrease with time, the model suggested 
by Cox (1972) is preferred.  The Cox model allows for the form of dependence of      
on   to remain unspecified as given by: 
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(5)            [     ]   
   
   is defined as a vector of the regression parameters and   is a vector of covariate 
values. The function       is known as the baseline hazard function. If the vector 
    , then the baseline becomes the hazard function. The Cox regression model can 
be rewritten as: 
(6)                
   . 
From here, the regression parameters,  , can now be estimated by maximizing the 
partial likelihood function.  From the estimated regression parameters, we can 
calculate hazard ratios associated with each covariate. The hazard ratios are calculated 
as: 
(7)          ̂  . 
 The hazard ratios can be interpreted as follows:  
(1) An increase in a continuous explanatory variable by   unit(s) will result in 
            percent increase in the hazard rate if the      (SAS 
Institute Inc. 2009).  Therefore a hazard ratio greater than one is associated 
with an increase in the hazard rate or the relative risk of a recall event. 
Hazard ratios greater than one indicate a positive association of that 
variable with recall risk.  
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(2)  An increase in a continuous explanatory variable by   unit(s) will result in 
            percent decrease in the hazard rate if the     .  Therefore 
a hazard ratio less than one is associated with a decrease in the hazard rate 
or the relative risk of a recall event. Hazard ratios less than one indicate a 
negative association of that variable with recall risk. 
 The Cox model assumes that the hazard functions are proportional over time 
and for strata of particular choices of the explanatory variables (Elandt-Johnson and 
Johnson 1999). Therefore, it assumes that ratio of hazard functions for observations do 
not depend on time (StatSoft, Inc. 2010).  
4.3 Discussion of Variables 
In the execution of the proportional hazards model we must identify several 
factors that we would like to test.  We will look into economic and management theory 
in an attempt to uncover what may be viable links to the risk that recall events occur 
over a period of time.  
We will first examine the work considering the nature of the firm by Coase 
(1937). His work considers the theoretical grounding of what a firm is.  He states, 
“A firm becomes larger as additional transactions (which could be exchange 
transactions co-ordinated through the price mechanism) are organized by the 
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entrepreneur and becomes smaller as he abandons the organization of such 
transactions.” 
Fundamentally, the size of the firm, as Coase explains it, can be interpreted as volume 
or sales. 
 Coase (1937) argues that efficiency within the firm tends to decrease as the firm 
becomes larger.  As a firm gets larger, the entrepreneur or management must organize 
an increasing number of transactions, both monetary and physical.  These transactions 
will also become more spatially distributed and dissimilar in kind.  The costs of 
organizing these transactions will eventually force the firm to reach a point where the 
costs of organizing an additional transaction within the firm are equal to the costs of 
carrying out the transaction in the open market.  In other words, it becomes optimal for 
the firm to outsource.  At this point the firm will cease physical expansion.  Coase 
(1937) explains this as the “diminishing returns to management.”  Consider a firm that 
initially produces a single good and employs a set of workers and technology for its 
production.  As the firm expands either vertically or horizontally, additional 
employment of workers or technology will be required.  However, as production levels 
and/or goods become more diverse, upper management will face a mounting problem 
of organization and supervision.   
 This concept is known as bounded rationality.  According to Simon (1957) and 
cited by Williamson (1981), “boundedly rational agents experience limits in formulating 
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and solving complex problems and in processing (receiving, sorting, retrieving, 
transmitting) information.”  Therefore, as the size of the firm increases, at some point, 
complexities within the firm limit management’s ability to organize, supervise, and 
implement employees, structure, and standards on an increasing quantity and variety 
of products and processes. 
 In the case of the food sector, this supervision constraint is a primary concern.  
Firms that are vertically integrated must insure that stages along the production path 
maintain quality and integrity. Firms that are horizontally integrated or produce 
multiple products must preserve safety over a widening variety of processes that may 
be very dissimilar.  Hence, there are limits to the employer’s authority and his or her 
ability to monitor an increasing number of integrated units and processes.  Therefore, 
in this paper we contend that the growing size of a firm will not lead to safer and more 
stringent food safety practices and therefore will increase the risk of recurrence of 
recall events.   
 Next we will delve into management and information theory and specifically the 
principal-agent model and signaling theory. The basic idea for the principal-agent 
signaling model has its roots in the asymmetric information model by Spence (1973).  In 
his hypothetical example, there are two types of employees also known as agents: a 
good employee with high productivity and a bad employee with low productivity.  
There is also an employer also known as the principal who has the desire to hire the 
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good candidate.  The employer is willing to compensate the good employee through a 
higher wage but initially cannot distinguish between the employee types.  The good 
employee recognizes that he or she must offer the employer some manner of signal 
that will indicate his or her type as a high productivity worker.  This could be given by 
some sort of education or discernment where the good employee must forgo an 
opportunity cost in order to signal his or her type. 
 In comparison, consider the agents as firms; one with a high quality, safe 
product, and one with a low quality, less safe product.  We could think of the principal 
as the customer who has an incentive to distinguish between the two goods and 
therefore the two agents that produce for it, but initially cannot tell them apart.  The 
higher quality producer has an incentive to characterize its product as distinct from the 
lower quality product.  One method to create this distinctive image is through branding 
and the subsequent advertising and goodwill opportunity costs that accompany it. 
Branding at its essence can be thought of as a principal-agent signaling device 
where the producing firm is the agent conveying meaningful information to the 
principal or consumer of the product.  In the case of the food sector, the conveyance 
mechanism is brand reputation and the meaningful information is safety and quality of 
the product.   
 As a complement to the principal-agent explanations for branding, we will 
explore a subject heavily studied in sociology and social psychology known as 
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impression management and apply it to our rationale.  According to Leary and Kowalski 
(1990), impression management is “the process by which people control the 
impressions others form of them.” Zadek et al. (1997), suggest that a firm’s reputation 
depends on “what people think is true and feel is important.”  Branding is a good 
example of how a firm attempts to control the impressions that consumers form about 
a product.  This is especially relevant with experience goods where consumers cannot 
easily observe some product characteristics such as quality.  Milgrom and Roberts 
(1986) note that: 
“It is clear that if high quality brands advertise more and if advertising 
expenditures are observable (even if not perfectly so), then rational informed 
consumers will respond positively to advertising, even if the ads cannot and do 
not have much informational content.” 
Many goods in the food sector can be thought of as experience goods.  Packaging often 
renders it impossible to determine the definite quality of the product contained.  
Pathogen concentration and contamination of fresh fruit, vegetables, dairy products, 
and meats are often undetectable to the naked eye.   
Branding may involve corporate level, umbrella branding where a single name 
marks a wide variety of products and/or product-specific branding.  Both management 
strategies are implemented as methods to convince and signal customers of quality and 
integrity of the product.  Research has found that umbrella branding generates savings 
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resulting from marketing and brand development (Erdem and Sun 2002). However, the 
long term increased expenditures and opportunity costs of multiple product branding 
may be an increased signal of quality across products. Branding and the number of 
brands that a firm owns are not necessarily related to the size of the firm.  Small firms 
can have a large portfolio of brands while large firms can be single branded.  
For these reasons, branding of products and number of brands appear to be 
very reasonable explanatory factors when considering food safety.  Here, we expect 
that both product branding and an increasingly large portfolio of brands will decrease 
the risk of recurrence of future recall events with the likelihood that branding is a signal 
of higher quality, safer products.  
Before we move on, we will admit that it may be that the predictions made by 
the Coase and brand-management arguments are inconsistent.  It may be perceived 
that a growing portfolio of brands will lead to complexities within the firm.  Therefore 
Coasian theory would content that the growing number of brands would be associated 
with less safe and less stringent food safety practices and therefore will increase the 
risk of recurrence of recall events.  We recognize this conflict but feel that for the 
branding variables the brand-management theoretical framework presented is the 
favorable approach. 
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4.4 Hypotheses 
As stated earlier, we contend that the growing size of a firm will not lead to 
safer and more stringent food safety practices and therefore will increase the risk of 
recurrence of recall events.  We expect that, controlling for firm branding, an increase 
in the size of a firm will increase the risk of recurrence of recall events and therefore 
the hazard ratios for the firm size variables        will be greater than one (FS denotes 
firm size). That is: 
(1)          , 
          . 
Also, we contend that both product branding and a growing portfolio of brands 
will decrease the risk of recurrence of recall events with the likelihood that branding is 
a signal of higher quality, safer products. We expect that, controlling for firm size, 
branding and an increasing portfolio of brands will decrease the risk of recurrence of 
recall events and therefore the hazard ratios for the branding variables       will be 
less than one (B denotes brand).  That is: 
(2)           
         . 
In closing, we believe that the Cox proportional hazard model extending from 
duration analysis is an appropriate model for examining the risk of recurrence of recall 
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events for firms.  From business and economic foundations, we have determined that 
firm size measured in sales and number of employees and branding by a firm are 
proper explanatory factors with regard to food safety.  We have come to the conjecture 
that escalating firm size will increase the risk of recurrence and branding will decrease 
the risk.  We will now test our hypotheses and present the results of our examination. 
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5. RESULTS 
 The results section is divided up into two major sections.  The first portion 
presents the results of the survival analysis models presented in the previous section.  
The second portion presents summary statistics and interesting findings from the data. 
5.1 Discussion of Models 
 We will begin by defining the explanatory variables that will be included in the 
Cox proportional hazard models.  Based on economic and management reasoning 
provided in previous sections, we have collected firm sales and employee data as 
indicators of firm size.  We have also collected data on branding by the firms and the 
number of brands that a firm owns.  The binary variable     indicates a firm that has a 
brand with a one and a firm that does not have a brand with a zero.  The variable     
indicates the number of brands within a firm, ranging from 0-50 in our data. 
 An issue that we would like to address is the possible problem of confounding 
between the two firm size variables.  We suspect that the two variables will be highly 
correlated.  It is logical that a firm with more employees will have higher sales and vice 
versa.  We will test the hypothesis: 
   (1)               
             . 
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The symbol          denotes the correlation coefficient of the most recent firm sales 
(MRS) and number of employees of the population (MRE).  The null hypothesis states 
that there is no correlation between the two variables.  Next, we calculate the Pearson 
correlation coefficient   ̂ and find that  ̂          at a significance level,   
      .  Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis that there is no linear relationship 
between the two variables.   We find that the correlation between the two variables is 
actually very high which confirms our thoughts.  
We will consider also the possibility that the firm size variables and the branding 
variables are correlated. For this procedure, we will test four hypotheses.  The first (2) 
will test the correlation between the sales variable and the binary brand variable, 
where         denotes the correlation coefficient.  The second (3) will test the 
correlation between the employees variable and the brand binary variable, where 
        denotes the correlation coefficient.  The third (4) will test the correlation 
between the sales variable and the number of brands count variable with         
denoting the correlation.  Finally, the fourth hypothesis (5) will test the correlation of 
the employees variable and the number of brands count variable, where         
denotes the correlation coefficient.  The hypotheses are presented as: 
(2)                
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(3)                   
                 
(4)                
                
(5)                
                
The results are presented in Table 6. 
 
 
Table 6. Correlation Coefficients between Regression Variables 
Correlation Significance Value 
 ̂                        
 ̂                        
 ̂                        
 ̂                        
 
 
          The null hypotheses state that there are correlations between the two respective 
variables.  As we can see, there is in fact a significant positive correlation between each 
respective pair.  According to Devore (2004), a reasonable rule of thumb is that the 
correlation is weak if              moderate if             , and strong if 
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           .  From this understanding, we can classify all four as having weak 
positive correlations.  At this point we will note that it may be useful to include 
interaction terms between the firm size variables and the branding variables in our 
models.  However, for the Cox proportional hazard regression the coefficients of these 
terms may not be interpretable and therefore we will continue without the interaction 
terms with the knowledge that weak positive correlation does exist. 
Based on our finding concerning the high correlation between the two firm size 
variables and the weak correlations between the firm size and branding variables, we 
feel that the best way to proceed from this point is to estimate four separate models.  
The first model will contain variables that measure the most recent firm sales in billions 
of dollars       and    .  The second model will contain variables that measure the 
most recent employee in thousands of employees       along with    .  The third 
model will contain    and the variable that measures the number of brands      . 
The fourth model will contain    and     The fourth model will contain    and 
     
5.2 Model 1 
 In our first model, we will estimate the regression parameters for    and 
   . The model is presented as: 
(1)                             
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Here,      is the risk of the second recall given that the firm has already had one recall.  
The maximum likelihood estimates for the parameter estimates, the hazard 
ratios rounded to three decimal places, and the Chi square significance values from the 
Cox proportional hazard model are provided in Table 7. 
 
Table 7. Cox Proportional Hazard Model for Covariates:     and    
Variable Parameter 
Estimate 
Pr > Chi Sq Hazard Ratio N 
    0.00952 <0.0001 1.010 157 
    0.81547 <0.0001 2.260  
 
 
         The effects of both explanatory variables are significant.  However, before we can 
interpret and conclude the validity of the results, we must confirm that the assumption 
of proportionality is satisfied. We will follow the procedures provided by UCLA 
Academic Technology Services (2007).  We will check this assumption by including time-
dependent covariates in the model. The time-dependent covariates are interactions of 
the explanatory variables with the time differential independent variable used to 
calculate the hazard function in our model.  This independent variable is the difference 
in days between first and second recall event and is given noted as          .  We will 
use the suggested and commonly used            or in our case,               
function of our time variable to interact with the covariates.  It should be noted that 
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any function of time would be appropriate.  Our model to test the proportionality 
assumption is given by: 
 
(2)                                                        
                . 
 According to UCLA Academic Technology Services (2007), a significant 
coefficient on the respective interaction variable indicates that there is a violation of 
the proportionality assumption for the specified variable.  The analysis of the maximum 
likelihood estimates is presented in Table 8. 
 
Table 8. Cox Proportional Hazard Model for Covariates:    ,   , 
                 , and                  
Variable Parameter 
Estimate 
Pr > Chi Sq Hazard Ratio n 
    0.00596 0.1091 1.006 157 
    0.2750 0.3058 1.317  
   
               
0.00107 0.1714 1.001  
   
               
0.11353 0.0329 1.120  
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It is obvious that the time-dependent covariate for the binary brands variable 
    is significant.  Before we conclude that     is non-proportional, we can consider 
a final option presented by UCLA Academic Technology Services (2007).  We can check 
if the variable truly violates the assumption by taking the supposed non-proportional 
predictor and stratifying by it.  If we estimate our model by strata and find that the 
estimate for the other parameter is similar to those found prior to the stratifications, 
then, we can believe that the variable in question should be included in our model as a 
proportional predictor and stratification is not necessary.   
We will test the brand variable by stratifying it into two categories: those with a 
brand and those without a brand.  The summary of the stratifications and the 
maximum likelihood estimate of the sales variable are provided in Table 9 and Table 10, 
respectively. 
 
Table 9.    Stratification Summary for Model 1 
Stratum     Total Observations 
1 0 577 
2 1 373 
Total  950 
 
 
Table 10. Cox Proportional Hazard Model for Covariates    with Stratified    
Variable Parameter Estimate Pr > Chi Sq Hazard Ratio 
    0.01006 <0.0001 1.010 
61 
 
 
As we can see, both the parameter estimate and hazard ratio for the sales 
variable are very close to that found in the non-stratified regression found in Table 7. 
Therefore, we can safely conclude that the brand variable is actually proportional and 
should be included in the model without stratification. 
 We can now turn back to the results in Table 6 and provide interpretations.  The 
parameter estimates are rather difficult to interpret due to the functional form of the 
model.  However, we can easily interpret the hazard ratios      that are directly 
calculated from the parameter estimates. We will follow the guide provided by SAS 
Institute Inc. (2009). An increase in a continuous explanatory variable by   unit(s) will 
result in           percent increase in the hazard rate if the    . For a binary 
variable, inclusion of an indicator equal to one will result in a           percent 
increase in the hazard rate if the    .  The hazard rate is defined as risk of 
recurrence of a recall event. 
Our final results for this model conclude:  
(1) Given that one recall event has occurred and controlling for if a firm has a 
brand or not, an increase in sales of $1 billion is associated with a 1.0 percent 
increase in the risk of recurrence of a recall event;  
(2) Given that one  recall event has occurred and controlling for sales of the firm 
in billions of dollars, the fact that a firm has a brand is associated with a 126.0 
percent increase in the risk of recurrence of a recall event. 
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We can also examine firms that have recall events subsequent to the 2nd event, 
3rd event, 4th event and so forth.  To do this, we will create further subsets of recall 
events that contain the required information on sales and branding.  To clarify, we will 
define the information contained within a subset as pertaining to the recall event given 
by the subset number and the next successive recall event.  Therefore, subset 02 
considers the times between events two and three, given a firm has experienced one 
recall event.  Subset 03 considers the times between events three and four, given that a 
firm has experienced events one and two. The interpretations of the regression results 
are the same as previously stated.  We will conduct this examination for nine additional 
subsets.  The results are given in Table 11. 
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Table 11. Cox Proportional Hazard Models for Subset 02 through Subset 10 for  
Model 1 
Subset Variable Parameter 
Estimate 
Pr > Chi Sq Hazard Ratio n 
02     0.01053 <0.0001 1.012 79 
     1.17341 <0.0001 3.233  
03     0.01303 <0.0001 1.03 51 
     1.46927 <0.0001 4.346  
04     0.01385 <0.0001 1.014 36 
     1.76536 <0.0001 5.844  
05     0.01470 <0.0001 1.015 28 
     1.96112 <0.0001 7.107  
06     0.01553 <0.0001 1.016 24 
     2.11706 <0.0001 8.307  
07     0.01611 <0.0001 1.016 19 
     2.28889 <0.0001 9.864  
08     0.01700 <0.0001 1.017 17 
     2.35885 <0.0001 10.579  
09     0.01731 <0.0001 1.017 15 
     2.52807 <0.0001 12.529  
10     0.01777 <0.0001 1.018 13 
     2.88820 <0.0001 17.961  
 
 
As an example, for subset number two the information considers the time 
between events two and three. The          is calculated as the number of days 
between the second and third recall events.  Given that a firm has initiated two recall 
events and controlling for firm branding, an increase in sales of $1 billion is associated 
with a 1.2 percent increase in the risk of recurrence of a recall event.  Given that a firm 
has initiated two recall events and controlling for firm size measured in billions of 
dollars, the fact that a firm has a brand is associated with a 223.3 percent increase in 
the risk of recurrence of a recall event.  As we can see, with significance, the risk of 
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recurrence of a recall event continues to increase for both a firm branding its products 
and for larger firms. 
The information for firm size and firm branding from Table 11 are presented in 
Figure 1 and Figure 2, respectively. 
 
 
Figure 1. Trend of the risk of recurrence of recall events by firm size measured in sales  
 for Model 1 
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Figure 2. Trend of the risk of recurrence of recall events by branding for Model 1 
  
Before moving on the next model, we will conclude that the branding binary 
variable has a very large effect on the relative risk of a recall event when compared to 
the effect of increased sales.   
5.3 Model 2 
In our second model, we will estimate the regression parameters for firm size as 
measured by thousands of employees       and our binary brand variable      .  
Due to the high correlation between firm sales and the number of employees that we 
observed earlier, we expect to see very similar results from this model as compared to 
the first model. The model is given as: 
(3)                            . 
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The maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters and hazard ratios along 
with their respective significance indicators are presented in Table 12. 
 
Table 12. Cox Proportional Hazard Model for Covariates    and    
Variable Parameter 
Estimate 
Pr > Chi Sq Hazard Ratio N 
    0.00343 <0.0001 1.003 188 
    0.83212 <0.0001 2.298  
 
 
As before, we must check the proportionality assumption using the method 
provided by UCLA Academic Technology Services (2007).  We must create a time-
dependent interaction for each of our two parameters,     and    .  Again, we will 
use the suggested and commonly used                function of our time variable to 
interact with the covariates.  Our model is given as: 
(4)                                                        
              . 
The results of the maximum likelihood estimates are provided in Table 13: 
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Table 13. Cox Proportional Hazard Model for Covariates   ,   , 
                 , and                  
Variable Parameter 
Estimate 
Pr > Chi Sq Hazard Ratio N 
    0.00307 0.0121 1.003 188 
    0.30506 0.2071 1.357  
   
               
0.00016 0.5210 1.000  
   
               
0.10791 0.0233 1.114  
 
 
As stated earlier, a significant time-dependent interaction suggests that there 
may be a violation of the proportionality assumption for the variable that is interacted 
with.  Therefore, the binary brand variable,    , is a potential problem.  Using the 
second procedure suggested by UCLA Academic Technology Services (2007), we will 
stratify the binary variable into two categories.  These two categories will include firms 
with a brand and firms without a brand.  We will then regress again.  The results of the 
stratification and the likelihood estimates are provided in Table 14 and Table 15, 
respectively. 
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Table 14.    Stratification Summary for Model 2 
Stratum     Total Observations 
1 0 612 
2 1 491 
Total  1103 
 
 
Table 15. Cox Proportional Hazard Model for Covariates    with Stratified    
Variable Parameter Estimate Pr > Chi Sq Hazard Ratio 
    0.01006 <0.0001 1.010 
 
 
The parameter estimate and hazard ratio for    in Table 15 are very similar 
to those found in our original model estimates in Table 12.  Therefore, we can conclude 
that the binary brand variable does not require stratification and satisfies the 
proportionality assumption. 
We will interpret the results using the guide provide by the SAS Institute Inc. 
(2009).  From Table 12 and the hazard ratios, we conclude that:  
(1) Given that one recall has occurred and controlling for branding by the firm, 
an increases in the number of employees by 1,000 is associated with a 0.3 
percent increase in the risk of recurrence of a recall event;  
(2) Given that one recall event has occurred and controlling for the firm size 
measured in thousands of employees, the fact that a firm has a brand is 
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associated with an 129.8 percent increase in the risk of recurrence of a recall 
event. 
Again, we can also examine firms that have subsequent recall events beyond 
the second event. We will follow the procedure described earlier and will examine nine 
additional subsets created from the branding and firm size with regard to employment 
numbers.  The results are given in Table 16. 
 
Table 16. Cox Proportional Hazard Models for Subset 02 through Subset 10 for 
 Model 2 
Subset Variable Parameter 
Estimate 
Pr > Chi Sq Hazard Ratio N 
02     0.00425 <0.0001 1.004 95 
     1.21544 <0.0001 3.372  
03     0.00474 <0.0001 1.005 60 
     1.54535 <0.0001 4.690  
04     0.00506 <0.0001 1.005 44 
     1.84100 <0.0001 6.303  
05     0.00541 <0.0001 1.005 34 
     2.03648 <0.0001 7.664  
06     0.00573 <0.0001 1.006 28 
     2.18493 <0.0001 8.890  
07     0.00592 <0.0001 1.006 22 
     2.37305 <0.0001 10.730  
08     0.00615 <0.0001 1.006 20 
     2.46926 <0.0001 11.814  
09     0.00615 <0.0001 1.006 18 
     2.65184 <0.0001 14.180  
10     0.00629 <0.0001 1.006 15 
     3.01798 <0.0001 20.450  
 
In Figure 3 and Figure 4 we can see that, with significance, the risk of recurrence 
of a recall event continues to increase with subsequent events, in association with 
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branding and increases in firm size as measured in thousands of employees. For 
example, given that a firm has initiated five recall events and controlling for firm 
branding, an increase in 1,000 employees is associated with a 0.5 percent increase in 
the risk of recurrence of a recall event.  Given that a firm has initiated five recall events 
and controlling for firm size measured in thousands of employees, the fact that a firm 
has a brand is associated with a 666.4 percent increase in the risk of recurrence of a 
recall event.   
 
 
 
Figure 3. Trend of the  risk of recurrence of recall events by firm size measured in  
employees for Model 2 
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Figure 4. Trend of the risk of recurrence of events by branding for Model 2 
 
  
5.4 Model 3 
In our third model, we will estimate the regression parameters for firm size as 
measured in billions of dollars       and the number of brands variable      .  The 
model is given as: 
(5)                            . 
 The maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters, hazard ratios, and 
significance values are presented in Table 17. 
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Variable
 
Parameter
 
Estimate
 
Pr
 
>
 
Chi Sq
 
Hazard Ratio
 
N
 
   
 
0.01191
 
<0.0001
 
1.012
 
135
 
   
 
0.01802
 
<0.0001
 
1.018
  
 
 
 
Table 17. Cox Proportional Hazard Model for covariates and MRS and NBS 
     
We will check the proportionality assumption using the method provided by 
UCLA Academic Technology Services (2007)  by creating time-dependent interaction for 
each of our two parameters,     and   .  As before, we will use the suggested and 
commonly used                function of our time variable to interact with the 
covariates.  Our model is given as: 
(6)                                                        
              . 
 The maximum likelihood estimates are provided in Table 18. 
 
 
Table 18. Cox Proportional Hazard Model for Covariates    ,   , 
                 , and                  
Variable Parameter 
Estimate 
Pr > Chi Sq Hazard Ratio N 
    0.00475 0.2733 1.005 135 
    0.00347 0.7702 1.003  
   
               
0.00203 0.0844 1.002  
   
               
0.00249 0.1161 1.003  
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A significant time-dependent interaction suggests that there may be a violation 
of the proportionality assumption for the variable that is interacted with.  All of the 
time-dependent variables are not significant individually. Therefore, we conclude that 
the proportionality of both the sales and brand parameters are valid and consequently, 
the original model, parameter estimates, and hazard ratios are valid. 
Therefore, from Table 17 and the hazard ratios, we conclude that:  
(1) Given that one recall has occurred and controlling for the number of brands 
that a firm has, an increases in sales of $1 billion is associated with a 1.3 percent 
increase in the risk of recurrence of a recall event;  
(2) Given that one recall event has occurred and controlling for the firm size 
measured in billions of dollars, an increase in the number of brands that a firm 
holds by one is associated with a 1.4 percent increase in the risk of recurrence 
of a recall event. 
We will examine firms that have subsequent recall events beyond the second 
event. We will follow the procedure described earlier and will examine eight additional 
subsets created from the number of brands and firm size with regard to sale.  The 
results are given in Table 19. 
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Table 19. Cox Proportional Hazard Models for Subset 02 through Subset 10 for 
Model 3 
Subset Variable Parameter 
Estimate 
Pr > Chi Sq Hazard 
Ratio 
N 
02     0.01613 <0.0001 1.016 61 
     0.02257 <0.0001 1.023  
03     0.01934 <0.0001 1.020 37 
     0.02552 <0.0001 1.026  
04     0.02198 <0.0001 1.022 22 
     0.02781 <0.0001 1.028  
05     0.02382 <0.0001 1.024 16 
     0.02938 <0.0001 1.030  
06     0.02550 <0.0001 1.026 14 
     0.03021 <0.0001 1.031  
07     0.02678 <0.0001 1.027 10 
     0.03023 <0.0001 1.031  
08     0.02826 <0.0001 1.029 10 
     0.03043 <0.0001 1.031  
09     0.02985 <0.0001 1.030 9 
     0.03067 <0.0001 1.031  
10 
 
    
    
0.03250 
0.03069 
<0.0001 
0.0001 
1.033 
1.031 
8 
 
 
Figure 5 and Figure 6 illustrate that, with significance, the risk of recurrence of a 
future recall event continues to increase in association with both an increase in the 
number of brands that a firm has and an increase in firm size as measured in billions of 
dollars of sales. 
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Figure 5. Trend of the risk of recurrence of events by firm size measured in sales  
 for Model 3 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Trend of the risk of recurrence of events by number of brands for Model 3 
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5.5 Model 4 
In our fourth model, we will estimate the regression parameters for firm size as 
measured in thousands of employees       and the number of brands 
variable      .  The model is given as: 
(7)                            . 
 The maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters, hazard ratios, and 
significance values are presented in Table 20. 
 
 Table 20. Cox Proportional Hazard Model for Covariates    and    
Variable Parameter 
Estimate 
Pr > Chi Sq Hazard Ratio N 
    0.00446 <0.0001 1.004 162 
    0.01786 <0.0001 1.018  
 
 
We will check the proportionality assumption using the method provided by 
UCLA Academic Technology Services (2007)  by creating time-dependent interaction for 
each of our two parameters,     and   .  As previously, we will use the suggested 
and commonly used                function of our time variable to interact with the 
covariates.  Our model is given as: 
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(8)                                                        
              . 
 The maximum likelihood estimates are provided in Table 21. 
 
Table 21. Cox Proportional Hazard Model for Covariates    ,   , 
                 , and                  
Variable Parameter 
Estimate 
Pr > Chi Sq Hazard Ratio N 
    0.00131 0.5520 1.001 162 
    0.00793 0.4811 1.008  
   
               
0.00080 0.0771 1.001  
   
               
0.00237 0.3096 1.002  
 
Again, a significant time-dependent interaction suggests that there may be a 
violation of the proportionality assumption for the variable that is interacted with.  All 
of the time-dependent variables are not significant individually. Therefore, we conclude 
that the proportionality of both the employment and brand parameters are valid and 
consequently, the original model, parameter estimates, and hazard ratios are valid. 
Therefore, from Table 20 and the hazard ratios, we conclude that:  
(1) Given that one recall has occurred and controlling for the number of brands 
that a firm has, an increase in employees by 1,000 is associated with a 0.4 
percent increase in the risk of recurrence of a recall event;  
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(2) Given that one recall event has occurred and controlling for the firm size 
measured in thousands of employees, an increase in the number of brands that 
a firm holds by one is associated with a 1.8 percent increase in the risk of 
recurrence of a recall event. 
We will examine firms that have subsequent recall events beyond the second 
event. We will follow the procedure described earlier and will examine nine additional 
subsets created from the number of brands and firm size with regard to employment.  
The results are presented in Table 22. 
 
Table 22. Cox Proportional Hazard Models for Subset 02 through Subset 10 for 
Model 4 
Subset Variable Parameter 
Estimate 
Pr > Chi Sq Hazard Ratio N 
02     0.00589 <0.0001 1.006 75 
     0.02135 <0.0001 1.022  
03     0.0067 <0.0001 1.007 44 
     0.02407 <0.0001 1.024  
04     0.00729 <0.0001 1.007 30 
     0.02667 <0.0001 1.027  
05     0.00772 <0.0001 1.008 22 
     0.02863 <0.0001 1.029  
06     0.00811 <0.0001 1.008 18 
     0.02912 <0.0001 1.030  
07     0.00827 <0.0001 1.008 13 
     0.02957 <0.0001 1.030  
08     0.00822 <0.0001 1.008 13 
     0.03169 0.0001 1.032  
09     0.00798 <0.0001 1.008 12 
     0.03381 0.0002 1.034  
10     0.00811 <0.0001 1.008 10 
     0.03504 0.0004 1.036  
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Figure 7 and Figure 8 illustrate that, with significance, the risk of recurrence of a 
future recall event continues to increase in association with both an increase in the 
number of brands that a firm has and an increase in firm size as measured in thousands 
of employees. 
 
 
Figure 7. Trend of the risk of recurrence of events by firm size measured in  
employees for Model 4 
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Figure 8. Trend of the risk of recurrence of events by number of brands for Model 4 
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capture the marginal effects of increments in these explanatory variables on the 
relative risk of a recall.  It will also be feasible to determine a threshold point.  The 
threshold or turning point is of merit as it will provide an introspective into the risk of a 
recall event based on the magnitude of the variable in question.  For this analysis, it 
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and the explanatory variables for largest and smallest firms or between the firms with 
the greatest number and least number of brands. 
5.7 Model 5 
We will begin by reexamining Model 1 from earlier in Section 5.  We will denote 
this model as Model 5. In this model we will estimate the regression parameters for 
sales measured in billions of dollars, a quadratic function of this sales variable, and the 
binary brand variable.  This model is presented as: 
(9)                           
        
Here,      is the risk of the second recall given that the firm has already experienced 
one recall event. 
 The maximum likelihood estimates for the parameter estimates, the hazard 
ratios rounded to three decimal places, and the Chi-square significance values form the 
Cox proportional hazard model are provided in Table 23. 
 
Table 23. Cox Proportional Hazard Model for Covariates:    ,    , and    
Variable Parameter 
Estimate 
Pr > Chi Sq Hazard Ratio n 
    0.02638 <0.0001 1.027 157 
     -0.00016 0.0003 1.000  
    0.71115 <0.0001 2.036  
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The effects of all explanatory variables are significant.  We will assume that all variables 
are proportional based on our findings in the initial model in Section 5. 
 At this time, we will examine the threshold point for our sales variable.  Again, 
the threshold is the value where the marginal effect on the relative risk associated with 
an incremental change in sales is zero.  We will begin by focusing on the hazard rate 
and the parameter estimates for sales.  The hazard rate associated with sales is 
presented as: 
 (10)                               
 To locate the threshold value, we must find the point where the slope of the 
hazard function is equivalent to zero.  To do this, we will differentiate this hazard 
function with respect to the independent variable   . Therefore, 
 (11)                               
 By setting the first derivative equal to zero and solving for the independent 
variable, we can calculate the threshold value. 
 (12)    
       
         
         
As sales are measured in billions of dollars, the threshold for sales is 82.4375 
billion dollars.  However, before we proceed, we should identify this point as a 
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maximum or minimum value of our quadratic function.  We accomplish this by taking 
the second derivative of our hazard function. 
 (13)                             
The second derivative is negative and therefore we have a maximum value at the 
threshold point for sales of 82.4375 billion dollars.  As the hazard rate is defined as the 
risk of a second recall given that a firm has experienced one recall event, this risk 
continues to increase at a diminishing rate for a firm up to 82.4375 billion dollars in 
sales.  At the threshold, the risk is the highest and beyond this point, the risk begins to 
decline. 
 We should mention that the threshold point of 82.4375 billion dollars in sales is 
at the higher end of the sales figures for the firms in this analysis where the average is 
12.301 billion dollars.  There are only two recall events in this model that have sales 
greater than the threshold point. Therefore, the quadratic function is concave down 
with only very few observations beyond the turning point. 
 We will now focus on the hazard ratios from our parameter estimates with 
guidance provided by SAS Institute Inc. (2009).  The hazard ratio for the binary brand 
variable is calculated from our parameter estimate. It is the exponential function of the 
parameter estimate for the brand binary variable. 
 (14)                        
84 
 
 
As we can see, there are separate hazard ratios calculated for the coefficients 
on both the linear and quadratic terms of the sales variable.  We can calculate a hazard 
ratio for the collective terms. This hazard ratio for the sales variable is a little more 
difficult to calculate considering the parameter estimate of the quadratic variable. We 
proceed taking the exponential function of the additive parameter estimates for the 
linear and quadratic variables (SAS Institute, 2010).  
 (15)                                      
From here, we can calculate the increase in the relative risk of a second recall event 
associated with a 1 billion dollar increase in sales.  This figure is calculated as the 
absolute value of one minus the hazard ratio and will be denoted as        . 
 (16)                             
We can also do a final check to make sure that we calculated the hazard ratio 
correctly.  We will calculate the individual hazard ratios for the two sales parameter 
estimates, from there the respective increases or decreases in the relative risk of a 
second recall event, and then add these individual relative risk influences to find the 
overall association of the sales variables to the relative risk of a second recall event. 
 The first step is to calculate the individual hazard ratios for the sales variables by 
hand. 
 (17)                            
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(18)                              
 The second step is to calculate the respective increases or decreases in the 
relative risk of a second recall event.  As the hazard ratio for the    term is greater 
than one, there will be an increase in the relative risk.  As the hazard ratio for the 
     term is less than one, there will be a decrease in the relative risk.  These are 
calculated as provided earlier in Section 5 by taking the absolute value of the difference 
between one and the respective hazard ratio.  Here we will denote the relative risk 
associated with the    term as       and the relative risk associated with the   
  
term as       . 
(19)                           
(20)                             
We must remember that the relative risk associated with the    term is increasing 
and that the relative risk associated with the     term is decreasing.  Therefore, to 
calculate the cumulative effect in relative risk associated with sales we will subtract the 
relative risk associated with     from the relative risk associated with   . 
(21)                                       
This is the same value that we found in equation (7), an overall increase in the relative 
risk associated with an increase of 1 billion dollars in sales. 
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We will now offer the interpretations of the hazard ratios for the sales and 
binary brand variables as we have in the previous section according to the guidance of 
SAS Institute Inc. (2009). 
(1) Given that one recall event has occurred and controlling for if a firm has a 
brand or not, an increase in sales of $1 billion is associated with a 2.7 percent 
increase in the risk of recurrence of a recall event when considering the 
decreasing marginal effects of an increase in sales. However, this effect is 
modestly diminishing after the threshold value for the largest firms. 
(2) Given that one  recall event has occurred and controlling for sales of the firm 
in billions of dollars, the fact that a firm has a brand is associated with a 103.6 
percent increase in the risk of recurrence of a recall event.  
 For the reexaminations of Model 2, Model 3, and Model 4, to be noted as 
Models 6,7, and 8 respectively,  we will not present the detailed background that we 
have for Model 5.  Instead, we will focus on the results of the examinations on the 
following pages. 
5.8 Model 6 
In this model we will estimate the regression parameters for employees 
measured in thousands, a quadratic function of this employees variable, and the binary 
brand variable.  This model is presented as: 
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(22)                           
        
The maximum likelihood estimates for the parameter estimates, the hazard ratios 
rounded to three decimal places, and the Chi-square significance values form the Cox 
proportional hazard model are provided in Table 24. 
 
Table 24. Cox Proportional Hazard Model for Covariates:    ,    , and    
Variable Parameter 
Estimate 
Pr > Chi Sq Hazard 
Ratio 
n 
    0.00982 <0.0001 1.010 188 
     -0.00002 <0.0001 1.000  
    0.75511 <0.0001 2.128  
 
 
The threshold point for the hazard function associated with employment 
numbers is calculated as before and has a value of 254,500 employees and is a 
maximum point.  It should be noted that we found the average number of employees 
to be 32,422 in Table 24.  Therefore, the threshold value is on the high end of our firm 
data. There are two recall events associated with a number of employees greater than 
the threshold value.   Again, the threshold is the point at which the risk of a second 
recall event occurring given that one recall event has occurred is the greatest.  Beyond 
this point, the risk begins to diminish.  
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 The cumulative hazard ratio for the employment term is calculated as 1.00986.  
The hazard ratio for the brand binary variable is given in Table 24 as 2.128. Therefore 
the hazard ratios for this model are interpreted as: 
(1) Given that one recall event has occurred and controlling for if a firm has a 
brand or not, an increase in employees by 1,000 is associated with a 0.1 percent 
increase in the risk of recurrence of a recall event when considering the 
decreasing marginal effects of an increase in employees.  Beyond the threshold 
point for employees, the effect is diminishing. 
(2) Given that one  recall event has occurred and controlling for number of 
employees in thousands, the fact that a firm has a brand is associated with a 
112.8 percent increase in the risk of recurrence of a recall event.  
5.9 Model 7 
In the seventh model we will estimate the regression parameters for sales 
measured in billions of dollars, a quadratic function of this sales variable, the number of 
brands variable, and a quadratic function of the number of brands variable.  This model 
is presented as: 
(23)                           
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The maximum likelihood estimates for the parameter estimates, the hazard 
ratios rounded to three decimal places, and the Chi-square significance values from the 
Cox proportional hazard model are provided in Table 25. 
 
Table 25. Cox Proportional Hazard Model for Covariates:    ,    ,   , and 
      
Variable Parameter 
 Estimate 
Pr > Chi Sq Hazard 
Ratio 
n 
    0.03499 <0.0001 1.036 135 
     -0.00020 <0.0004 1.000  
    0.02939 0.0864 1.030  
     -0.00037 0.2664 1.000  
 
  
The parameter estimates for the sales variables are both significant, where 
those for the number of brands are not.  For our analysis, we will consider the number 
of brands term to be linear and will not consider the quadratic term due to its very high 
p-value.  
 Again we will calculate the threshold value for the sales term. It has a value of 
87.547 billion dollars which is comparable to the figure that we found in Model 5.  
Again, we mention that most of the firms fall well below this figure.  There were two 
recall associated with sales values above the threshold value. 
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 We calculate the cumulative hazard ratio for the sales term as 1.0356 and note 
that the hazard ratio from the number of brands variable in Table 25 is 1.030. 
Therefore: 
(1) Given that one recall event has occurred and controlling for the number of 
brands controlled by a firm, an increase in sales of 1 billion dollars is associated 
with a 3.6 percent increase in the risk of recurrence of a recall event when 
considering the decreasing marginal effects of an increase in sales.  This relative 
risk begins to diminishes beyond the threshold point. 
(2) Given that one  recall event has occurred and controlling for sales in billions 
of dollars, an increase in the number of brands that a firm holds by one is 
associated with a 3.0 percent increase in the risk of recurrence of a recall event. 
5.10 Model 8 
 In our final model we will consider the number of employees, a quadratic 
function of this term, the number of brands, and a quadratic function of the number of 
brands.  The model is presented as: 
(24)                           
              
  
The hazard ratios, parameter estimates of the maximum likelihood functions, and the 
Chi-square significance values are provided in Table 26. 
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Table 26. Cox Proportional Hazard Model for Covariates:    ,    ,   , and 
     
Variable Parameter 
Estimate 
Pr > Chi Sq Hazard Ratio n 
    0.01528 <0.0001 1.014 162 
     -0.00005 <0.0001 1.000  
    0.05368 <0.0001 1.055  
     -0.00071 0.0080 0.999  
 
 
It is obvious that all of the parameter estimates and therefore the hazard ratios 
for explanatory variables are significant. 
The threshold value for the employment parameters has a value of 152,800 
employees and the threshold value for the number of brands is 37.80.  Both of these 
figures are on the higher end of the values in the data. There are five recall associated 
with firms having sales values greater than the threshold value and three events 
associated with firms having a greater number of brands than the threshold for brands. 
In fact, the most brands controlled by a single firm in our dataset are fifty.   
The value of the cumulative hazard ratio for the employee term is 1.0154 and 
the value of the cumulative hazard ratio for the number of brands term is 1.0544. 
Therefore: 
(1) Given that one recall event has occurred and controlling for the number of 
brands a firm has, an increase in 1,000 employees is associated with a 1.4 
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percent increase in the risk of recurrence of a recall event when considering the 
decreasing marginal effects of an increase in employees. The relative risk 
associated with an increase in the number of employees diminishes after the 
threshold value for the firms with the greatest number of employees. 
(2) Given that one recall event has occurred and controlling for the number of 
employees measured in thousands, an increase in the number of brands that a 
firm holds by one is associated with a 5.5 percent increase in the risk of 
recurrence of a recall event when considering the diminishing marginal of an 
increase in the number of brands.  This relative risk diminishes after the 
threshold for the firms holding the largest number of brands. 
5.11 Summary Statistics and Findings 
At this point, we would like to discuss some summary statistics and interesting 
findings that are not directly related to the models that were analyzed.  We will begin 
by discussing the most recent sales (MRS) and most recent employees (MRE) variables 
that were created to represent firm size.  The results are reported in Table 27 and Table 
28, respectively.  From the original corporate information data, we can see that the 
mean sales were $12.302 billion with a minimum observation of only $100,000 and a 
maximum observation of $120.439 billion.  We were able to collect 909 MRS 
observations.   The mean value MRE was 32,422 employees with a minimum 
observation of one employee and a maximum observation of 351,000 employees. Good 
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Karma Food Technologies had only one employee and the Target Corporation had 
351,000.   We should also comment on the fact that the threshold values for sales 
found in Models 05 and 07 are much greater than the median shown in Table 27.  This 
gives a depiction of the very slow and gradual curvature of the quadratic function 
where the majority of firms have sales below the turning point.  The same is found with 
respect to the threshold values of the employment terms found in Models 06 and 08.  
With a median value of 1,135 employees and a threshold ranging from 150,000 to 
250,000, we can get a picture that most of the firms are located well below this 
threshold value. 
 
Table 27. Most Recent Sales       Descriptive Statistics 
Number of Observations 909 
Mean $12.302 Billion 
Standard Deviation $27.230 Billion 
Minimum Value $100,000 
Maximum Value $120.439 Billion 
25th Percentile $6 Million 
Median $180 Million 
75th Percentile $7.586 Billion 
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Table 28.  Most Recent Employees       Descriptive Statistics 
Number of Observations 1,066 
Mean 32,421.606 
Standard Deviation 69,692.543 
Minimum Value 1 
Maximum Value 351,000 
25th Percentile 45 
Median 1,235 
75th Percentile 25,820 
 
 
The next data that we would like to mention are from the original recall dataset.  
Figure 9 and Figure 10 capture the types of products recalled.  Figure 9 shows the types 
of goods as percentages of total goods recalled over the January, 2000 through 
October, 2009 time span.  Figure 10 compares the groups by the actual number of 
recall events.  Confectionary goods topped the results with 483 recall events.  Many of 
these events are due to in-store bakeries of retail supermarkets, having problems 
connected with mislabeling and ingredients that may be potential allergens.  
 Figure 11 and Figure 12 capture the problems associated with the product recall 
events over the January, 2000 to October, 2009 period.  Figure 11 captures the 
problems associated with the recall events as percentages of the total recalls.  Figure 
12 compares the problem types by the actual number associated with each. As we can 
see, most of the recalls were the result of salmonella contamination and mislabeled 
ingredients. 
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 Figure 13 compares the frequency of recall occurrence due to specific 
pathogens that include Salmonella, E. coli, and Listeria. As we can see, the frequencies 
tend to move together and there were large spikes in all three in 2009. The sharp 
increases in Salmonella cases in 2009 were due to two specific events.  The first was 
triggered a bulk recall of peanut butter by the Peanut Corporation of America. This 
recall affected many other secondary manufacturers that used peanut butter as an 
ingredient in their goods. The second was triggered by a large recall of pistachios by 
Setton Pistachios of California. 
Figure 14 and Figure 15 capture the percentage of recall events occurring by 
year and the trend in the number of recall events issued, respectively.  The trend is 
rather steady throughout the 2000 to 2008 period ranging from 123 to 216 recalls with 
a moderate spike in 2002 with 283 recalls.   However, there is a considerable spike in 
2009 with 742 events reported through October of that year. 
Figure 16 captures the state of origin for the product recalling firm.  Firms in 
several states have issued over 100 recalls.  In fact, New York led with 400, followed by 
California with 330, New Jersey with 120, Michigan with 114, and Illinois with 107.  
There were no firms that issued a recall from the state of Wyoming. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Products recalled by type (January 2000-October 2009) 
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Figure 10: Frequency of products recalled by product type (January 2000-October 2009) 
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Figure 11. Problems associated with recall events (January 2000-October 2009)     
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Figure 12. Frequency of problems associated with recall events (January 2000-October 2009) 
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Figure 13. Frequencies of recall occurrence due to specific pathogens (January 2000-October 2009)  
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Figure 14. Occurrences of recall events by year (January, 2000-October, 2009) 
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Figure 15. Trend of recall events by year (January 2000-October 2009) 
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Figure 16. Recall events per state (January 2000-October 2009)
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 There are several firms that are noteworthy based on the high frequency of 
recall events per firm.  Some of these firms are presented in Table 28 along with a brief 
description of their primary business activities, whether the company is public or 
private, the number of recall events occurring between January, 2000 and October, 
2009, and the sales for the firm.  Information for their business activities was collected 
from their respective corporate websites. While the vast majority of firms have only a 
few recall events, it is interesting that some firms have as many as 18, 19, or 20 recall 
events over an approximate ten year period. 
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Table 29. Noteworthy Examples of Firms with Multiple Recalls 
Firm Business Activities Public/Private Recall Events  Sales 
(Billions) 
Cargill, Inc. Food, Agricultural, 
Financial and 
Industrial Products 
and Services 
Private 20 $120.439 
ConAgra Foods Consumer Foods 
and Commercial 
Products 
Public 19 $12.731 
Harry and David 
      Holdings, Inc. 
Direct Marketing 
and  
E-Commerce  
Private 19 $0.541 
Kellogg Company Cereals and 
Convenience Foods 
Public 15 $12.822 
Kraft Foods, Inc. Food Products Public 18 $42.201 
Nestlé S.A. Nutrition, Health 
and Wellness 
Products 
Public 18 $104.061 
The Kroger 
Company 
Grocery, 
Department Stores, 
Jewelry Stores  
Public 19 $76.000 
Tyson Foods, Inc. Chicken, Beef, and 
Pork Food Products 
Public 14 $26.862 
Whole Foods 
Market,   
     Inc. 
Natural and 
Organic Foods 
Public 18 $7.954 
     
Sources: Cargill, Inc. (2010); ConAgra Foods (2010); Giant Food, Inc. (2010); Harry and David 
(2010); The Kellogg Company (2010); Kraft Foods, Inc. (2010); Nestlé (2010); Tyson Foods, Inc.  
(2010); Whole Foods Market, Inc. (2010). 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
In conclusion, we will first examine our initial hypotheses and the results of our 
analyses. Then we will consider further food safety work that may be of interest and 
could be realized as accompaniments to this initial research. 
Based upon economic and management theories presented in Section 4, we 
made two hypotheses.  The first hypothesis contended that, controlling for firm 
branding, an increase in the size of a firm will increase the risk of recurrence of recall 
events.  Therefore, we expected the hazard ratios for the firm size variables to be 
greater than one.  This hypothesis was based on our belief that the larger firm is 
expected to face bounded rationality constraints and be less able to manage effectively 
across production. 
In our analysis, we failed to reject our hypothesis as we found consistently 
significant hazard ratios greater than one for the firm size measures of sales in billions 
of dollars and thousands of employees in all three models.  The results conform to the 
economic theories proposed by Coase (1937) and Simon (1957) on bounded rationality 
within the firm.  As the size of the firm increases, growing complexities within the firm 
limit management’s ability to organize, supervise, and implement employees, structure, 
and standards on an increasing quantity and variety of products and services. The 
hazard ratios for firm size were small and increased with the number of food recalls. A 
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threshold in the growth rate of risk increasing was found at size increases of  82.4375 
billion dollars in sales and at 254,500 employees. 
The second hypothesis contended that, controlling for firm size, branding by the 
firm and an increasing portfolio of brands within the firm will decrease the risk of 
recurrence of recall events.  Therefore, we expected the hazard ratios for branding by 
the firm and the number of brands within the firm to be less than one. This hypothesis 
was based on our belief that branding is a signal of higher quality, safer products. 
In our analysis, we rejected our hypothesis as we found consistently significant 
hazard ratios greater than one.  This occurred for branding by the firm in Model 1 and 
Model 2, and for the number of brands within the firm in Model 3 and Model 4.  The 
hazard ratios for brands were very large and they increased with the number of 
occurrences of food recalls. 
It is imperative that we offer several alternative plausible explanations for our 
findings that the relative risk of recall events increases as both firm size measured in 
sales and employees and branding by a firm increase.  We will first begin by considering 
the firm size. 
 It may be the case that larger firms control larger volumes of product that is at 
risk of a problem occurring.  The association of increased relative risk of recall to firm 
size may actually be an attribute of the volume of product processed by the firm.  The 
likelihood of a rare event occurring that could trigger the need for a recall would lead to 
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more recalls for firms that process higher volumes.  If it is possible to gather accurate 
information about the product volumes of firms in the food industry, the understanding 
of this influence on the firm size indicators of risk could be enhanced.  The data we 
have available is for values of sales, not volume, and is not used in a normalization of 
the risk. 
 A second alternative plausible explanation with regard to the increase in relative 
risk of larger firm size may be due to the possibility that larger firms process riskier 
products.  For example, many meat and poultry processors are very large and process, 
handle, and ship millions of pounds of product over a relatively short period of time.  
The risk of contamination for these products from pathogens such as E. coli and 
Salmonella is higher than for most other products.  This is partly due to the fact that the 
animals to be processed usually enter the facilities with the pathogen present on their 
bodies.  This could be studied by utilizing information on the type of problem 
associated with each individual recall event and level of severity such as the recall 
classification system used by FDA and FSIS. 
 A third alternative plausible explanation for the increased relative risk of a recall 
for a larger firm may be partly explained by the experience and education levels of 
employees.  It is widely believed that many large production operations in the food 
sector employ unskilled and inexperienced workers on production lines.  This is 
transparent in the produce and meatpacking industries where seasonal and migrant 
109 
 
 
workforces are essential requirements for cost reduction in a competitive environment.  
If workers do not understand food safety practices and do not recognize the potential 
consequences of failures, then it is possible that they will not uphold food safety as a 
priority.  Information such as indicators of employee age, relevant work experience in 
the food sector, education levels, and provisions of food safety training may assist in 
painting a clearer picture of influence of experience and education on the association 
of firm size to relative risk of a recall event. 
 A final plausible explanation for the increased relative risk of recalls associated 
with firm size may relate to short-term pressures from shareholders.  Many larger firms 
are publicly traded.  Pressures to increase sales, revenues, and profits may encourage 
management to forgo some costly quality and safety practices.  Dr. Frank Dooley 
(2010), professor of agricultural economics at Purdue University suggested that stock 
prices and other financial indicators for publically traded firms could be a starting point 
for this analysis.  This information is readily available and accessible, but incorporating 
it into this model may prove to be difficult.  Data pertaining to the many small private 
companies would not be available and therefore a separate analysis considering only 
publically traded firms could be performed.  
Now we will shift focus to providing several alternative plausible explanations 
for the increased relative risk associated with branding. 
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 The first alternative plausible explanation that we will suggest may be that 
consumers’ higher expectations of the quality of branded products pressures firms to 
maintain this expectation through voluntary and preventative recall announcements 
that might not otherwise be necessary from a health perspective.  For example, the 
Kellogg Company (2010), the worlds’ largest cereal manufacturer, recently announced a 
recall of 28 million boxes of Apple Jacks, Corn Pops, Fruit Loops, and Honey Smacks 
branded cereals.  The recall was due to an unusual odor originating from the packages’ 
plastic linings.  The company noted that the potential for health problems associated 
with the problem was low and that the recalled products did not meet the company’s 
quality standards.  This is an example of a very large and expensive recall with the 
express purpose of proactively protecting a brand image and upholding consumers’ 
expectations.  Measuring these types of recalls would be very challenging but a 
breakdown of recalls due to these types of actions could assist with determination of 
this impact on the relative risk of recall due to branding.  
 A second and related alternative plausible explanation for the increased relative 
risk of recalls due to banding may come from pressure to voluntarily recall products as 
the result of media coverage.  Branded firms and products are clearly more visible to 
the everyday food consumer.  Through marketing, firms have made many of their 
products household names synonymous with the intended use of the product.  With 
this familiarity, media and consumer activist scrutiny has propagated.  The media tends 
to focus on stories that appeal and relate to most people and food safety issues 
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involving well known branded items and firms are no exception.  This is especially 
relevant when the product in question is potentially harmful to those members of 
society who are the most vulnerable, such as children and the elderly.  Positive press 
coverage of a proactive firm may be much less damaging to long term brand reputation 
than negative coverage of a reactive firm.  This would be difficult to measure.  
Information on type of recall as being proactive or reactive and a quantitative 
examination of respective press coverage and audience might shed some light on the 
influence to relative risk of a recall associated with branding. 
 Another alternate plausible explanation could be due to firms’ need to offset 
risk by creating additional brands.  If a firm feels that certain products are riskier that 
others within its portfolio, the firm may create a brand with little investment in brand 
equity and incorporate these riskier products into that new brand.  This will allow the 
firm to offset negative publicity and effects on the brand image that the firm feels are 
more vital.  Peter Thor (2010), owner of Bellissimo Foods, a major Italian foods 
distributor in the United States, commented that his firm has started rebranding its 
products that are imported from China to something other than the primary Bellissimo 
brand.  This is in response to the higher potential of a food safety event occurring with 
the Chinese products.  It is an effort to prevent a disaster that could ruin the company’s 
principal brand with the possibility of bankrupting the firm.  Information concerning the 
country of origin of products supplied under a brand name is difficult to obtain at this 
time due to confidentiality concerns but could be very beneficial.  
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We feel that an additional possible explanation may be found in the idea that 
management may be focusing on the short-run.  Swinbank (1993) considered that “if 
the short-run profits of supplying shoddy goods now outweigh the long-run benefits of 
protecting the brand, it would be rational for the profit-maximizing firm to deceive 
customers and supply faulty products.”  This proposal may be most credible for small 
firms that develop brands that are not widely recognized and that did not require a 
great deal of investment. These firms can simply develop another brand to replace the 
one experiencing a recall.  A final explanation may be found in the notion that large 
firms that brand their products do so as an investment in goodwill as a form of 
insurance against problematic events.  These firms may attempt to convince customers 
of the quality of the product through branding, just as we suggested.  However, this 
investment is offset by an actual decrease in quality after a long period of high quality.  
Here, the firm relies greatly on consumer loyalty to the brand and must be willing to 
expend resources for development and protection of the brand.   
Further, we examined several interesting findings concerning the frequencies of 
recall events based on the product type, problem associated with the recall, specific 
pathogens, annual recall events, and geographic location of the firms associated with 
the events. 
We feel that further analysis and examination of the recall and corporate 
information databases that have been assembled is of interest.  One possible research 
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endeavor may focus on recall events that are due only to pathogen contamination as 
these are the events that receive the highest level of public attention and are linked to 
public health.  Another could expand the corporate level information to include more 
recent and comprehensive data on sales, employment numbers, and brands.  A final 
possible undertaking could examine a case study of one very significant recall event 
that involved the Peanut Corporation of America. This event encompassed a large 
group of firms that produced a variety of products.  These are just a few examples of 
future research that may be embarked on with the information that is currently 
available.  
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APPENDIX 1 
Table A1. Direct Regulation, Buyer Requirements, and Food Safety Technology Impacts on the 
Costs of Complying with PR/HACCP 
 Slaughter Processing 
Variables Cattle Hogs Chicken Cooked Raw 
Intercept -0.002 
(-0.13) 
-0.033 
(-2.03) 
0.009 
(0.58) 
0.002 
(0.10) 
-0.037+ 
(-1.31) 
Wages  
State_Wage -0.001*** 
(-2.68) 
0.001*** 
(4.21) 
-0.0008 
(-1.90) 
-0.0010** 
(-2.38) 
-0.0004+ 
(-1.41) 
Private Actions  
Indirect   
Human Capital 
Experience_QC 
-0.009+ 
(-1.48) 
-0.007+ 
(-1.33) 
0.0008 
(0.28) 
-0.013+ 
(-1.45) 
0.006 
(1.21) 
Physical Capital 
FS_Tech 
0.042** 
(2.64) 
0.046** 
(2.51) 
0.014 
(1.28) 
0.038* 
(1.65) 
0.056*** 
(3.99) 
Direct  
Buyer 0.013** 
(2.28) 
0.012** 
(2.19) 
0.009* 
(1.67) 
-0.0004 
(-0.05) 
0.007+ 
(1.48) 
Process -0.006 
(-0.60) 
-0.005 
(-0.95) 
-0.0001 
(-0.02) 
-0.010 
(-1.20) 
0.0002 
(0.03) 
Regulation Effects  
Indirect  
Employees -0.0036 
(-0.97) 
-0.0049 
(-0.75) 
-0.008*** 
(-0.31) 
-0.006 
(-0.31) 
-0.031*** 
(2.50) 
Multi -0.002 
(-0.27) 
-0.011+ 
(-1.50) 
0.0004 
(0.06) 
0.002 
(0.25) 
0.003 
(0.51) 
Cap_Lab -0.00004 
(-0.27) 
-0.0002* 
(-1.90) 
0.00002 
(0.16) 
0.000002 
(0.01) 
-0.00001 
(-0.06) 
Direct  
Plan_Sales 0.865+ 
(1.58) 
-0.105 
(0.13) 
9.23*** 
(2.23) 
6.97*** 
(5.31) 
3.32*** 
(3.99) 
Tasks_EMP 0.0002** 
(1.96) 
0.0003*** 
(4.55) 
-0.0003 
(-0.77) 
0.0002** 
(2.27) 
0.00034*** 
(2.97) 
Shar_HACCP_Task    0.018 
(0.69) 
-0.00008 
(0.00) 
0.005 
(0.27) 
0.029 
(0.90) 
0.015 
(0.45) 
PW_QC 0.012* 
(1.90) 
0.012* 
(2.00) 
-0.004 
(-0.96) 
0.017* 
(1.70) 
0.014** 
(2.35) 
   0.36 0.50 0.16 0.28 0.39 
Observations   81 82 64 191 109 
Source: (Ollinger, The Direct and Indirect Costs of Food Safety Regulation CES 08-31 2008), Page 
27  t-statistics in parentheses. +,*,**,***: 80, 90,95,99 percent levels of significance.  
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